

Police and Crime Commissioner Elections

MEND Manifesto 2016



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Introduction

On Thursday 5 May, the electorate in England and Wales will go to the polls to elect 41 Police and Crime Commissioners. The elected post, first contested in November 2012, will give local communities the opportunity to have their say on the delivery of policing services in their local area.

Police and Crime Commissioners are responsible for delivering an efficient and effective police force in their constabulary region. They have powers to appoint or dismiss Chief Constables and are responsible for the creation and delivery of a local police and crime plan; for the allocation of a police force budget; to ensure that community needs are met as effectively as possible by working in partnership with a range of agencies at the local and national level; and to prevent and reduce crime.

This manifesto considers a range of policing matters that have an impact on British Muslims.

Since publishing our 2012 manifesto, we have witnessed a rise in anti Muslim hate crime, new and emerging movements on the British and European far right, inspection and review of the use of stop and search powers and disproportionate use of these powers against ethnic minorities, and a new localised agenda on policing, supported by the creation of the PCC role.

We have also seen an expansion of the role of the police in the delivery of the much criticised Prevent strategy as a new statutory duty imposed on a range of institutions, including schools, universities and hospitals, shifts operations into the 'pre-criminal space' to identify 'signs of radicalisation' with the aim of preventing a move to extremist violence.

How PCCs and national policing strategies have addressed some of these issues since the election of the first Police and Crime Commissioners is reviewed here.

As police budgets face cuts, the challenge for constabularies now is to do more with less. While deliberations on allocating spending on force priorities will require some level of creativity to stretch funds sufficiently to meet local needs, meeting



the challenge of doing more with less through better community engagement and trust cannot be underestimated.

The Crime Survey for England and Wales for 2012/13 showed a marginal difference between White and non-White respondents on perceptions of the police. A slightly higher proportion of White respondents reported having more confidence in the police (75%) than non-White respondents (72%).

The recently announced BME 2020 Vision strategy, which includes a target on increasing diversity in police recruitment, is a welcome step in a wider strategy of supporting BME communities in accessing employment, enterprise and education. Achieving targets on increasing diversity in police recruitment relies, in no small part, on trust in policing and touches on many of the issues discussed here.

By enhancing Muslim engagement in the PCC elections and raising awareness and expectations about policy issues that impact on British Muslims, we hope perceptions of and confidence in the police will improve further still and, in turn, have an impact on increasing diversity in the police.

This manifesto has been developed to encourage British Muslim participation in the PCC election. We have produced this election briefing guide to provide Muslims with useful background information on our key campaign issues: tackling Islamophobia, community policing and crime and security.

This manifesto is presented to elicit support and encouragement from candidates seeking election for the policy asks presented here.

By enhancing Muslim engagement in the PCC elections and raising awareness and expectations about policy issues that impact on British Muslims, we hope perceptions of and confidence in the police will improve further still and, in turn, have an impact on increasing diversity in the police.

Manifesto pledges:

On Tackling Islamophobia:

- Commit to a training programme for police officers to properly identify and record anti-Muslim hate crime.
- Commit to evaluating third party reporting centres and improve provisions for Muslims to report hate crime in their local area.
- Commit to appointing an officer with speciality training on racial and religious hate crime to work with Muslim communities to improve hate crime reporting, incident investigation and community partnerships.
- Commit to supporting improvements to security at Islamic places of worship and Muslim schools.
- Commit to addressing the threat posed by far right groups and right wing extremism, including on-street protests and social media forums that foment anti-Muslim prejudice.

On Community policing:

- Commit to enforcing the 10 recommendations proposed by HMIC on improving the use of stop and search and compliance with the 'Best use of stop and search scheme'.
- Commit to train officers in detecting 'unconscious bias' to improve stop and search 'hit rates' and consistently demonstrate grounds for 'reasonable suspicion'.
- Commit to increasing recruitment, retention and promotion of BME officers with clear plans to improve diversity in senior ranks.
- Commit to improving Muslim participation in consultative forums including in Independent Advisory Groups.

On Crime and security:

- Commit to publishing comprehensive data on Channel referrals annually on the constabulary and police.uk websites.
- Commit to holding regular public meetings with local communities in order to dispel the lack of transparency about Prevent delivery and enhance on trust and confidence in police roles in programme delivery.
- Commit to consulting with local Muslim communities on local crime and policing strategy.





Executive Summary

The election of Police and Crime Commissioners for 41 constabularies in England and Wales presents a renewed opportunity to make local forces more responsive and responsible to the local communities that they serve.

In November 2012, at the first election of Police and Crime Commissioners, we prepared a briefing paper setting out key pledges sought to address policing issues impacting on Muslim communities.

For the next election on Thursday 5 May 2016, we have published this manifesto which reviews progress on pledges advanced in 2012; surveys new policing areas that impact on Muslim communities; and sets out pledges sought from candidates standing in the 2016 elections.

The key issues covered here can be summarised as transparency, accountability, crime reduction and racial and religious equality. The pledges proposed in this document arise from analysis of existing and new data in relation to tackling Islamophobia, community policing and crime and security.

The main points are:

- Data collection on anti-Muslim hate crime is inadequate and fails to reflect the true scale of Islamophobic hate crime occurring in the UK.
- The introduction in April 2016 of a new recording process which will see Islamophobia recorded as a separate category of crime, as proposed in our 2012 manifesto, provides a opportunity for all forces to address the issue of hate crime reporting systems and accurate data collection on Islamophobia.
- Recording anti-Muslim hate crime relies upon proper training of police officers to correctly identify the bias motivation and to consider the victim's perception of the perpetrator's hostility. The introduction of the new recording system must be coupled with better training for officers.
- Third party reporting centres play a vital role in marginalised communities who may struggle to report hate crime incidents directly at their local police station. Our assessment of third party reporting centres in 41 constabularies in England and Wales shows that provisions for Muslim communities is far from satisfactory. Working with Muslim communities to improve provisions for hate crime reporting must be a priority in forces' local hate crime strategy.
- The announcement by the Prime Minister of new funding to be made available for security measures at "faith establishments" is welcome and local Muslim communities must be supported in funding applications to secure premises such as local mosques and Muslim schools from Islamophobic attacks.
- The far right continues to present a major threat to Muslim communities with convictions for murder, assault and arson serving as a reminder of the criminal actions of individuals motivated by anti-Muslim hostility. Low level intimidation that accompanies on-street protests by far right groups in town and cities across the country and the drain on police budgets of policing protests is a further area that needs attention by incoming PCCs.
- In our analysis of annual reports published in the period 2013 - 2015, we found little evidence of a local strategy for tackling the far right. We have also published a record of all far right protests targeting Muslim communities in the period 2013 - 2015, and the costs of policing these (where available).
- Despite suggested recommendations on the use of stop and search powers and the threat of statutory legislation to limit its use in a bid to improve stop-to-arrest ratios and curtail disproportionate use against ethnic minorities, stop and search continues to show evidence of 'institutional racism'. Muslim communities continue to face disproportionate use of terrorism stop and search powers, Section 43 (TACT 2000) and Schedule 7 stops and search. The impact on community policing of the excesses which fall foul of the 'Best use of stop and search scheme' will need careful attention to enforce compliance and to tackle 'unconscious bias'.

- The Vision 2020 strategy, which supports BME communities in employment, education, apprenticeships and recruitment to the police force sets ambitious targets for increasing diversity in police recruitment. Small steps have been taken by some forces to open up recruitment to BME applicants but figures show that the police force remains predominantly White. Achieving the targets in the Vision 2020 strategy will require greater drive to increase recruitment and considered attention on retention and progression if BME communities are to be better represented at all ranks.
- Consultative forums in the form of Independent Advisory Groups are a brilliant mechanism to provide forces with 'critical friends' and a broad range of advice during 'critical incidents' but while IAGs are intended to reflect communities in the force area, a lack of transparency on composition renders it difficult to ascertain whether communities are indeed represented, and by whom. Greater transparency is vital to ensuring IAGs perform effectively in the purpose for which they are designed: a forum for dialogue between a local force and the local community.
- One of the most troubled areas of police relationships with Muslim communities relates to their role in the delivery of Prevent; a strand of the counter-terrorism strategy.
- The introduction of a statutory duty on Prevent across a range of specified authorities such as schools, hospitals, prisons, probation services, universities and local authorities has extended the 'securitisation' of relations between police officers and local communities. Interaction is most keenly felt in relation to Channel, the controversial programme which deals with individuals deemed 'at risk' of 'vulnerability to radicalisation'.
- We have found that the number of Channel referrals for children aged 10 and under and 11 to 15 (inc) has increased by 700% and 258% respectively in the period 2007 - March 2012 and 1 April 2012 - 10 Dec 2015. The number of referrals of children aged 10 and under from two regions with large Muslim populations, North West and West Midlands, accounted for 51% of all referrals from April 2012 to 10 Dec 2015. The number of referrals of children aged 11 to 15 (inc) from the North West and West Midlands regions accounted for almost 40% of all referrals between April 2012 and 10 Dec 2015.
- Questions about the quality of training provided to agencies and frontline officers to prepare them for the enforcement of the statutory duty and the basis on which referrals to the Channel programme are made have come under sustained scrutiny as stories abound about pupils being spoken to by Prevent officers without parental consent or being referred to the Channel programme for innocent mix ups in spelling or speech.
- Data on Channel referrals is frequently denied when requested under Freedom of Information. Data disclosed by the National Police Chiefs Council shows that only 1 in 5 of those referred to the Channel programme between April 2007 and March 2014 required "supportive interventions." That means 80% of referrals exited the system at the preliminary assessment stage. This is a unusually high number of unwarranted referrals raising serious questions about training quality and impact on innocent victims.
- The available Channel referral data also reveals the high proportion of referrals that come from the education sector, compared to all other sectors. 75% and 68% of all Channel referrals of children aged 10 and under and 11 - 15 between April 2012 and 10 Dec 2015 came from the education sector.
- Publishing Channel data on constabulary websites on an annual basis can bring much needed transparency to this area of policing and can guard against intrusive inquiries and unjustified referrals to a counter-terrorism intervention programme.
- Crime reduction is a priority for all residents in local communities and consulting on local crime and policing strategies will remain a key plank of a PCCs role.

Tackling Islamophobia


The rise in the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes in the UK have been a cause of concern in Muslim communities for several years. Official statistics show a 44% and 43% increase in religious hate crimes respectively in the periods 2013-14 and 2014-15. Home Office statistics also reveal that racial and religious hate crimes continue to account for the vast majority of police recorded hate crime in the UK, almost 90%.

The regular publication of hate crime statistics by the Home Office in recent years has enabled a clearer assessment on the state of hate in the UK, as has the publication of statistics by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on racial, religious and Islamophobic hate crime in London.

In July 2015, the MPS announced that Islamophobia in London had risen by 70.1% compared to the same period in the previous year (July 2014). In December 2015, the year on year increase was 68.9%. Figure 1, below, shows the steady increase in Islamophobia in London in the last six months of 2015.

The MPS is one of the few police forces that regularly publish statistics on Islamophobic hate crime.

Figure 1



Source: Metropolitan Police Service, crime figures 2015

Since 2012, we have been working with elected Police and Crime Commissioners to improve available data on anti-Muslim hate crime by urging forces to adopt the recording of Islamophobia as a separate category of crime.

In order to address the issue of Islamophobia, an accurate count of the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes in any given year, and comparisons across years as well as data comparison with other forces, are all vital.

We have had some success in advocating for an improvement in the recording of anti-Muslim hate crime with 10 out of 41 forces in England and Wales committing to implementing a separate crime flag on Islamophobia.

We look in detail at what statistics reveal about racial and religious hate crime levels in recent years and Muslim victimisation, but first we present the definitions of racial and religious hate crime.

What is a hate crime?

It may seem a fairly obvious thing when discussing anti-Muslim hate crime to assume that individuals are aware of what constitutes a hate crime and how it differs from a hate incident.

Academic research on hate crime in the UK shows that many victims of hate crime are unable to identify when and why the criminal threshold has been crossed¹ and when it is time to report an incident to the police or a third party reporting centre.

Among problems contributing to the under-reporting of hate crime, is a lack of awareness of what a hate crime is.

The legal definition of racial hate crime is:

“Any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person’s race or perceived race.”

The legal definition of a religious hate crime is:

“Any criminal offence which is perceived by the victim or any other person to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person’s religion or perceived religion.”

Key to tackling anti-Muslim hate crime, and other forms of hate crime, is by educating individuals and communities on what is a hate crime and who can report it.

Incidence of hate crime in England and Wales

Among commitments entered into by the Coalition Government in its Hate Crime Strategy 2012, updated in 2014, was to “publish police data on recorded hate crimes as national statistics which can be compared between forces.”²

The first set of statistics on hate crime in England and Wales were published in September 2012 and covered the period April 2011 to March 2012. The second set of data on police recorded hate crime followed in December 2013 and subsequent reports have been published in October 2014 and October 2015.

Alongside the publication of police recorded hate crime, the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) provides further statistical data about levels of under-reporting of hate crime, effects of hate crime on victims, as well as information on hate crime victims’ levels of satisfaction with the police.

Table 2 provides details of police recorded hate crime by monitored strand (the ‘protected characteristics’ covered by the 2010 Equality Act) and shows the jump in religious hate crimes between 2012/13 and 2014/15.

While police recorded crime data provides figures for those hate crimes that came to the attention of the police, given the huge problem of under-reporting, the data is not sufficient in assessing the actual level of hate crime.

The Crime Survey for England and Wales offers a further source of information about hate crime and the disparity between victim experiences and police recorded crime.

1. Chakraborti et al (2014). The Leicester Hate Crime Project

2. HM Government (2012). *Challenge it, Report it, Stop it, The Government’s Plan to Tackle Hate Crime*

Table 1:
Hate crimes recorded by the police by monitored strand, 2011/12 to 2014/15, England and Wales

Hate crime strand	2011/12	2012/13	% change 2011/12 to 2012/13	2013/14	% change 2012/13 to 2013/14	2014/2015	% change 2013/14 to 2014/15
Race	35,944	35,845	0.2-	37,466	5	42,930	15
Religion	1,618	1,572	3-	2,269	44	3,254	43
Sexual orientation	4,345	4,241	2-	4,584	8	5,597	22
Disability	1,748	1,911	9	2,006	5	2,508	25
Transgender	313	364	16	557	53	605	9
Total number of motivating factors	43,968	43,933	0.08-	46,882	7	54,894	17
Total number of offences	N/A	42,255	N/A	44,471	5	52,528	18

Statistics from the CSEW in 2010/11 and 2011/12 (combined) compared to police recorded crime in 2012/13 showed that 40% of hate crime incidents came to the attention of police in 2012/13. Figures from the CSEW for the period 2012/13 to 2014/15 showed that 48% of hate crime incidents came to the attention of the police. While this is an improvement, it still represents less than 50% of all hate crime and is lower than the 51% reported in the CSEW 2007/8 and 2008/9 combined surveys.

The 2012/13 CSEW estimated the total number of hate crime in England and Wales as 278,000 while police recorded hate crime amounted to 42,236 incidents.³ Based on combined data from the 2012/13 to 2014/15 CSEW, there were an estimated 222,000 hate crimes on average per year for the five monitored strands, while police recorded hate crime figures sum up to 52,528.

Under-reporting of hate crime clearly remains a serious issue, as can be seen in the low percentage of hate crime incidents reported to the police. The table below shows the falling rate of reporting of crime in general and hate crime in particular:

Table 2:
Percentage of CSEW hate crime incidents that came to the attention of the police

	2007/08 to 2008/09		2009/10 to 2011/12		2012/13 to 2014/15	
	Percentage reported to police	Unweighted base	Percentage reported to police	Unweighted base	Percentage reported to police	Unweighted base
All hate crime	51	516	49	666	48	409
All CSEW crime	39	24,935	39	34,314	40	20,718

3. Home Office: Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops and searches, quarterly update to 31 December 2014), accessible at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-december-2014/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stops-and-searches-quarterly-update-to-31-d/> [last accessed 15.03.16]

Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics

From these combined surveys, it is estimated that 0.1 per cent of adults were victims of a religiously motivated hate crime in the 12 months prior to interview. The 2012/13 to 2014/15 CSEW showed that Muslim adults were the most likely to be a victim of religiously motivated hate crime. Muslims were 12 times more likely to be a victim of religious hate crime than a Christian or a Buddhist, and adults with an Asian ethnic group were seven times more likely to be victims of a religiously motivated hate crime than adults of a White ethnic group.

Data from the CSEW on racially motivated hate crime is shown in table 3 below. The data shows that adults in non-White ethnic groups were much more likely to be victims of racially motivated hate crimes than White adults (1.0% of Asian and 0.7% of Black adults compared with 0.1% of White adults).⁴ Again, Asians and Black adults were 10 and 7 times more likely to suffer from race hate crime than White victims.

Analysis of racially motivated hate crime by religion is also revealing. It shows that Muslim adults were also more likely to be victims of racially motivated hate crime (1.2%) compared to individuals reporting a Christian (0.1%) or no faith (0.1%) background. From the table, Muslims are a shocking 12 times more likely to suffer race hate crime than a person of Christian or agnostic/atheist background.

Table 3
Percentage of adults aged 16 and over who were victims of racially-motivated hate crime, by ethnic group and religion, 2007/08 and 2008/09, 2009/10 and 2011/12, 2012/13 and 2014/15, CSEW

	2007/08 & 2008/09		2009/10 & 2011/12		2012/13 & 2014/15	
	All racially motivated hate crime	Unweighted base	All racially motivated hate crime	Unweighted base	All racially motivated hate crime	Unweighted base
ALL ADULTS	0.3	93,123	0.3	137,344	0.2	103,601
Ethnic Group						
White	0.1	86,628	0.1	126,435	0.1	93,891
Mixed/multiple ethnic groups	3	555	0.9	991	1.1	971
Asian/Asian British	2.1	3,290	1.8	5,459	1	5,126
Black/African/Caribbean/Black	1.7	1,855	0.8	2,919	0.7	2,770
Other ethnic group	2	777	1.5	1,322	0.8	735
Religion						
Christian	0.2	72,171	0.2	104,370	0.1	66,564
Buddhist	0.9	432	0.8	636	0.1	422
Hindu	2	864	1.1	1,415	0.6	1,254
Muslim	2.5	1,882	2.2	3,378	1.2	3,001
Other	0.7	1,251	0.7	1,784	1.2	1,449
No religion	0.2	16,252	0.2	25,401	0.1	30,712

Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, 2014-15

The high incidence of racially motivated hate affecting Muslims can be seen across the periods analysed, from 2007/08 to 2014/15. While an observable decline has occurred since 2007/08 and 2008/09, comparative levels of Muslim victimisation remains high.

Despite the easier availability of hate crime statistics, assessing the level of anti-Muslim hate crime in the UK is compounded by the method of recording the 'bias motivation' in police recorded hate crime data. The tables above indicate the crossover of Muslim hate crime victims in racial and

4. Corcoran, H., Lader, D. and K. Smith. (2015). Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15 Statistical Bulletin 05/15. Office for National Statistics. p.19

religious hate crime data.

Muslims are not a race but Islamophobia can and does often manifest itself as a 'racist' hate crime. Anti-Muslim hate crime cuts across racial and religious bias motivations making both categories relevant to the derivation of quantitative data on anti-Muslim hate crime.

The College of Policing in its revised 'Hate Crime Operational Guidance' (2014) notes the following:

Measuring anti-Muslim hate crime in isolation, without considering other motivations such as race, will give only a limited picture of the risks to local communities and their needs.⁵

The risk of being a victim of personal hate crime in the 2012/13 to 2014/15 CSEW was highest among those with the religious group 'other' (1.1%) or Muslim (0.6%) compared with 0.1% of Christian respondents. This means Muslims or "other" minority religious groups were 11 times more likely to be at the receiving end of personal hate crime. People with Black (0.7%), Asian (0.5%) or Mixed Ethnic (1.4%) backgrounds were also more likely to be at the receiving end compared with White adults (0.1%). Again, the statistics show how if you're Black and Asian you are, respectively, 7 and 5 times more likely to be at the receiving end of personal hate crime.⁶

Statistics for the previous 12 months, 2013/14, showed that public order offences and violence against the person were the two most common offences associated with hate crime for all strands except religion. Public order offences accounted for 60% of all race hate crime. For religious hate crime, public order offences were the most common (46%) followed by more serious criminal activities such as criminal damage and arson (25%).

Based on data from the CSEW for 2012/13 to 2014/15, it is estimated that there were an average of 38,000 incidents of religiously motivated hate crime per year. This total was split fairly evenly between personal crimes (21,000 incidents) and household crimes (17,000).

It is important to note that the CSEW is a survey based dataset and that the variance between police recorded crime and CSEW figures are, in some degree, based on the different methods of deriving statistical data. Furthermore, the noted increase in hate crime may, in part, be due to "an improved identification of motivating factors behind an offence."

Data on hate crime is indicative not just of the scale of the problem, but also of its impact. According to the 2012/13 to 2014/15 surveys victims of hate crime were more likely than victims of crime overall to say they were "emotionally affected" by the incident (92% and 81% respectively) and more likely to be "very much" affected (36% and 13% respectively). More than twice as many hate crime victims said they had suffered a loss of confidence or had felt vulnerable after the incident (39%) compared with victims of crime overall (17%) and hate crime victims were also more than twice as likely to experience fear, difficulty sleeping, anxiety or panic attacks or depression compared with victims of overall crime (surveyed in the CSEW).

Victims of hate crimes were more likely to say they were very dissatisfied with the police following the offence (35%) compared to 14% for all other offences.

The fourth national survey on ethnic minorities carried out in 1993 and 1994 found a link between experiences of racism in Black and Asian communities in England and Wales and mental health. The study found that individuals who had experienced a racist incident in the preceding year were 3 times more likely to suffer from depression or psychosis in the case of verbal abuse; and 3 times more likely to suffer from depression and 5 times more likely to suffer from psychosis in the case of racist attacks.⁷

Acting on hate crime is more than just about prosecuting perpetrators. It is also about giving victims the confidence to overcome hate incidents that are motivated by another's hostility to their race, religion or other identity marker.

5. College of Policing (2014) Hate Crime Operational Guidance. p. 40. Downloaded at: http://www.report-it.org.uk/files/hate_crime_operational_guidance.pdf

6. Corcoran, H., Lader, D. and K. Smith. (2015). Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15 Statistical Bulletin 05/15. Office for National Statistics. p.16

7. Karlsen, S. and J. Y. Nazroo. (2002). Relation Between Racial Discrimination, Social Class, and Health Among Ethnic Minority Groups, *American Journal of Public Health* Vol 92(4): 624-63.



Rotherham pensioner, 81, punched, kicked and stamped on in 'racist' murder

Rotherham pensioner Mushin Ahmed was on his way to early-morning prayers when he was subjected to a sustained assault and then left for dead on August 10 last year.

Source:

<http://mend.org.uk/two-men-jailed-for-murder-of-muhsin-ahmed/>

Recording Islamophobia

For the periods April 2013 to March 2014 and April 2014 to March 2015, we attempted to derive information on the level of anti-Muslim hate crime in England and Wales by seeking disaggregated data on the victims of racial and religious hate crime by self-defined ethnicity and self-defined religious identity from police forces in England and Wales.

The method is unsatisfactory given the level of ethnic diversity among British Muslims and the intersectional nature of some hate crime. Using a method reliant on ethnic proxy means that a range of Muslim hate crime victims are neglected (for example, White British converts or Somali and Nigerian Muslims). Nonetheless, by seeking information about race hate crime victims who identified as Pakistani or Bangladeshi, and religious hate crime victims who identified as Muslim, we uncovered a number of issues that hamper the quantity and quality of data on anti-Muslim hate crime. We also identified the 'hidden Islamophobia,' where anti-Muslim hate crime incidents are obscured by their presence in 'racially aggravated' offences and discounted in assessments examining 'religiously aggravated' offences alone in estimating levels of anti-Muslim hate crime. We found that there were 5,395 racial and religious hate crimes in 2013-2014 and 5,724 in 2014-15 where the victim's ethnic identity was Pakistani/Bangladeshi or religious identity was Muslim. This is greater than the aggregate of religious hate crimes, 2,269 and 3,254 respectively, in the police recorded hate crime data. The disparity highlights the need for a better method of recording anti-Muslim hate crimes.

The primary problem is that police forces in England and Wales do not uniformly record Islamophobia as a separate category of crime. In our 2012 PCC manifesto, we asked candidates to pledge to the recording of Islamophobia as a separate category of crime as is the case with racist and anti-Semitic crimes.

Recognising the difficulties in assessing levels of anti-Muslim hate crime from extant recording practices, we worked with incoming Police and Crime Commissioners to roll out better recording of anti-Muslim hate crime through adoption of a separate flag to denote a bias motivation that was in the victim's perception, or that of any other person, motivated by anti-Muslim hostility.

The Hate Crime Strategy published by the Government in 2012 and updated in 2014 did not include a change to recording practices among its commitments. However, in October 2015, the Prime Minister announced that recording Islamophobia as a separate category of crime would be made a mandatory requirement for all police forces in England and Wales putting the recording of Islamophobia on par with anti-Semitism, which is recorded separately.

The new system of recording Islamophobia will be implemented from April 2016. The introduction of the new recording method will require better training of police officers to identify and record anti-Muslim hostility as the 'bias motivation' when flagging Islamophobic hate crime.

Commit to appointing an officer with speciality training on racial and religious hate crime to work with Muslim communities to improve hate crime reporting, incident investigation and community partnerships

National and local hate crime strategies

The Government released the Hate Crime Strategy in 2012⁸ outlining three key strands on tackling hate crime:

1. To prevent hate crime - by challenging the attitudes that underpin it, and intervening early to prevent it escalating;

8. HM Government (2012). *Challenge it, Report it, Stop it, The Government's Plan to Tackle Hate Crime*.

2. To increase reporting and access to support - by building victim confidence and supporting local partnerships; and
3. To improve the operational response to hate crimes - by better identifying and managing cases, and dealing effectively with offenders.

The national strategy identified 23 action points in relation to the first objective, 16 in relation to the second objective and 14 in relation to the third objective.

The initial Hate Crime Strategy did not have a developed approach to Islamophobic hate crime as can be seen by the piecemeal, instead of integrated approach, and the broad, generic targets. And while the strategy noted a number of important interventions, such as “awareness raising materials to tackle anti-Muslim hatred”; “exploring the conditions that create anti-Muslim hatred and undertaking a scoping exercise to create an evidence base”; and included a sub group on “challenging the role of the media”, the greater part of outcomes appear to have had little bearing on the stated objective of tackling anti-Muslim hate crime.

The 2014 updated report identified projects such as the ‘Big Iftar’, ‘commemorating the sacrifice of soldiers in World War 1’ and ‘supporting Remembering Srebrenica’ as evidence of project outcomes.

The subsequent resignations of Professor Matthew Goodwin⁹ and Dr Chris Allen¹⁰ from the Cross Government Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hatred, citing a lack of interest among Government ministers to take Islamophobia seriously, further demonstrates the low priority given to tackling Islamophobia in national hate crime strategies.

The Government strategy, however, does note the importance of local action plans on tackling hate crime and states “[L]ocal strategies for tackling hate crime should reflect the needs and priorities of local victims and communities, rather than priorities imposed by Whitehall. The role of Government was to set a national direction and support those locally-led efforts.”¹¹

This means the role of the PCC remains crucial in shaping local hate crime policy and approaches. Moreover, localised strategies, instead of a top-down approach from central government, ensures that victims’ needs are met at the level where they matter most: in the local context.

In order to assess local hate crime strategies, we undertook a review of the annual reports published by Police and Crime Commissioners over the period 2013 – 2015. We systematically went through all the annual reports for each of the 43 police forces around the country and assessed them on a number of criteria including hate crime strategies, tackling Islamophobia and challenging the far right. Here we focus particularly on hate crime and Islamophobia.

There is a general paucity of information available on most PCCs’ annual reports, with some exceptions. Furthermore, an alarming 26% of PCCs do not even mention hate crime once in their annual reports, while only 30% mention their active work on improving hate crime reporting and 30% also report on their work on victim support.

Out of the 43 forces, 10 made no mention whatsoever of any hate crime related activity. That is not to say that none took place, however it is indicative of the priorities placed on hate crime strategies by a PCC that no mention is made of it in the annual report detailing the preceding 12 months’ activity. It also raises questions over what hate crime related work did take place, if any.

9. ‘The fight against Islamophobia is going backwards’, *The Guardian*, 19 October 2015

10. ‘Why I Quit the Government’s Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group’, *Huffington Post*, 29 December 2014

11. HM Government (2012) *Challenge it, Report it, Stop it, The Government’s Plan to Tackle Hate Crime*, Downloaded from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97849/action-plan.pdf [accessed 01/01/16] p.6

The 10 PCC areas where no reported activity was noted are:

1. Devon and Cornwall (C)*
2. Dyfed-Powys (C)
3. Gloucestershire (I)
4. Hampshire (I)
5. Humberside (C)
6. Lincolnshire (I)
7. North Wales (I)
8. South Yorkshire (L)
9. Surrey (I)
10. Wiltshire (C)

*The “L”, “C”, and “I”, denote Labour, Conservative, or Independent respectively.

Of these 10 forces, 4 were Conservative PCCs, 6 were Independents, and one was a Labour PCC.

The differences in approach are perhaps indicative of wider party political approaches. In 2015, the Labour party in its election manifesto set out its policy on hate crime, as:

*“We will take a zero-tolerance approach to hate crime, such as anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. We will challenge prejudice before it grows, whether in schools, universities or on social media. And we will strengthen the law on disability, homophobic, and transphobic hate crime.”*¹²

The Conservative party’s manifesto stated:

“We will review the legislation governing hate crimes, including the case for extending the scope of the law to cover crimes committed against people on the basis of disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity.”

The manifesto did not address racist or religious hate crime specifically, nor did it address the rising number of Islamophobic attacks. This is instructive, as only one of the Conservative PCCs specifically addressed religious hate crime and none addressed Islamophobia in particular, though they did often address disability, sexual orientation, and transgender hate crime (4 out of 17 PCCs), and 13 out of 17 Conservative PCCs had at least a general mention of hate crime.

On the other hand, 4 out of 13 of the Labour PCCs specifically address religious hate crime and Islamophobia as an action point and a focal issue in their annual reports and 12 out of 13 mention at least some hate crime work ongoing. This again reflects the priorities mentioned in the manifesto, as well as greater Muslim populations in these constabularies.

A consistent approach from all Police and Crime Commissioners, regardless of political affiliation, is important to implementing the broader objectives of the national hate crime strategy as well as local priorities on tackling hate crime.

Figures from police recorded crime and the Crime Survey for England and Wales denote the prevalence of racial and religious hate crime in the UK. It is crucial that Police and Crime Commissioners respond to growing victim needs by prioritising hate crime in local crime and policing plans by broadening the number of victim groups whose needs are addressed therein.

All hate crime is abominable and all victim groups should feel that their particular needs, and those of other vulnerable groups, are being equally addressed without preference or prejudice.

12. Labour Party 2015 General Election Manifesto, pg 15

Training for police officers

A good hate crime strategy should incorporate officer training to help police officers to identify bias motivation and record hate crime properly such that the aggravated element(s) are clearly labelled and victims offered the opportunity to disclose their perception of the perpetrator's hostility.

A report by Dr Loretta Trickett from Nottingham Law School¹³ featured on the True Vision website, found that whilst police officers were clear about what a hate crime is and how to deal with it procedurally, their current training does not equip them to deal with more complicated cases. Current police training for hate crime was delivered either by simulated computer programmes or via equality and diversity courses, neglecting real case studies and victim personal experiences.

Dr Trickett observed: "Many of the officers I interviewed were not fully engaged with the training in its current format. Officers felt that they would instead benefit more if they could hear about colleagues' personal experiences and knowledge of dealing with hate crime and incidents, and gain an insight into what officers in other roles might do.

"However, an issue that police officers often face is that of exposure. Many police officers, particularly newer recruits, have limited experience of hate crime and incidents, exacerbated by the fact that they are often unreported."

To deal with these challenges, Dr Trickett suggested officers are trained using a range of real cases to increase officer exposure to the problem. The police also need more resources that can help signpost them to relevant agencies who can continue the work in providing support to victims of hate crime.

Out of the 32 forces which did mention some form of hate crime activity in annual reports, just 5 cited some element of officer training. These activities included investing in a resource pack, investing in training of local community reporting centres (third party reporting centres), hate crime awareness training and putting funds towards research and education of hate crime.

These 5 forces were:

- Leicestershire
- Durham
- Thames Valley
- Warwickshire
- West Yorkshire

A number of other forces and PCCs had a lot of useful activity around hate crime, and some may be at a level of maturity with dedicated hate crime officers that training is no longer seen as required. But the very low number who are investing in training and education for their officers is worrying. There was no mention of Islamophobia-specific or religious-hate-crime-specific training.

Commit to a training programme for police officers to properly identify and record anti-Muslim hate crime

13. Trickett, L.(undated) *The Policing of Hate Crime in Nottinghamshire*, Downloaded from: http://report-it.org.uk/files/nottinghamshire_police_final_draft.pdf [accessed 15/01/16]

In addition to reviewing PCC annual reports for evidence of hate crime related initiatives, we also contacted all police forces asking whether they employed officers with “specialist training” on anti-Muslim hate crime to work with Muslim communities on tackling Islamophobia, reporting incidents and supporting victims.

We found that 9 out of 41 police forces employed officers to work closely with Muslims communities. These are: Northumbria, Cheshire, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Bedfordshire, Surrey, Avon and Somerset, Sussex and Norfolk.

Of the remaining forces, 23 designated officers to work with all faith groups including Muslim communities and 5 forces did not disclose any information on the employment of specialist officers working specifically with Muslim communities or faith groups in general (South Yorkshire, Staffordshire, Hertfordshire, Hampshire and Thames Valley).

Third party reporting centres

Third party reporting centres (TRCs) were introduced in the MacPherson report to provide members of marginalised communities with means to report hate crime incidents without involving direct encounters with the police.

The MacPherson report, highlighting the problems faced by marginalised communities in directly accessing policing services when it came to reporting hate crime, noted:

“all possible steps should be taken by Police Services at local level in consultation with local Government and other agencies and local communities to encourage the reporting of racist incidents and crimes. This should include: (1) the ability to report at locations other than police stations; and (2) the ability to report 24 hours a day.”¹⁴

TRCs provide an alternative avenue for marginalised communities and serve as a vital link connecting vulnerable victims to the criminal justice system by channelling incident reports and other data to the police, and other human rights agencies.

Though local councils and police constabularies have adopted the practice of establishing TRCs, their effectiveness in meeting the needs of victims have not, in general, been adequately evaluated.¹⁵

Research shows that victims of hate crime are largely unaware of the availability of options to report hate crime at places like their local library, citizens advice bureaux and council run ‘One Stop Shops’.¹⁶

In order to assess provisions for Muslim communities in constabularies across England and Wales, we consulted all Police and Crime Commissioner websites and local council websites, falling within the boundaries of each respective constabulary, to ascertain the number of TRCs registered as third party reporting centres and the number of these which were specific to Muslim communities.

The data shows an alarming dearth of TRCs that are dedicated to providing Muslim victims of hate crime with local reporting centres. While improvements can be identified, for example, the broadening of TRCs to include universities (Sheffield, Cumbria, Chester, Leeds and Salford universities are all listed as TRCs as is the University of Central Lancashire Students Union), the number of TRCs that are registered as catering for Muslim victims is remarkably low.

We found 2,011 TRCs established across force areas in England and Wales (excluding the Metropolitan Police Service). Of these, 47 were identified as centres established for use by Muslim

14. MacPherson, W. (1999) *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry*. pp. 376-377.

15. Manchester City Council, *Hate crime strategy document 2016-2019*. Available at: http://www.manchester.gov.uk/downloads/download/5185/hate_crime

16. Chakraborti et al (2014). *The Leicester Hate Crime Project report, findings and conclusions*, p 75

communities.

In five force areas, we were unable to identify TRCs on the PCC or constabulary websites: Hampshire, Kent, Avon and Somerset, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire.

In 24 force areas, we were unable to identify TRCs which catered specifically for Muslims, for example in mosques, Islamic community centres, Muslim schools or other venues frequented by Muslims. These force areas are: Durham, Northumbria, Cheshire, Cumbria, Humberside, North Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire, Staffordshire, West Mercia, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Norfolk, Surrey, Sussex, Devon and Cornwall, Thames Valley and Dorset.

The remaining force areas offered a range of third party reporting centres where Muslims could report hate crime: Greater Manchester (8); West Midlands (6); Lancashire (5); West Yorkshire (3); Dyfed-Powys (4); Gwent (4); North Wales (5) and South Wales (7).

Wales performed better than constabularies in England with almost one in ten TRCs in Wales, (20 out of 194) being a centre established for use by Muslim communities.

We also assessed annual reports from all Police and Crime Commissioners for the period 2013 - 2015, to examine mentions on improving hate crime reporting and the creation of or support for TRCS for this purpose.

13 of 41 PCCs mentioned working on increasing hate crime reporting in their regions with 7 in particular mentioning work with third parties and local organisations in a bid to improve reporting. Merseyside, West Midlands, and Leicestershire in particular had strong and robust campaigns with third party reporting centres serving Muslim communities from local centres such as mosques.

Other activity included working with a national anti-Muslim hate crime reporting centre, supporting local groups, and investing on reporting and referral services locally.

The 13 forces are*:

1. Merseyside (L)
2. West Midlands (L)
3. Leicestershire (C)
4. West Mercia (I)
5. Warwickshire (I)
6. Sussex (C)
7. South Wales (L)
8. Northumbria (L)
9. Metropolitan (C)
10. Hertfordshire (C)
11. Greater Manchester (L)
12. Cambridgeshire (C)
13. Bedfordshire (L)

*The "L", "C", and "I", denote Labour, Conservative, and Independent respectively.

As can be seen there was a roughly even split Conservative and Labour PCCs on working to improve hate crime reporting.

While national avenues, such as the True Vision website and its online reporting form, have been advanced as a means of providing alternative procedures for reporting hate crime, local provisions lag seriously behind.

With the emphasis in the national Hate Crime Strategy on local plans to tackle hate crime and support victims, the neglect of local provisions for Muslims is gravely concerning.

Hate crime affects individuals living in local communities. Whether it is hostility expressed by a neighbour, a stranger in the street, in a local supermarket, at school or university, or on public transport networks linking local communities, hate crime is a local problem and supporting victims should be reflected in the adoption of local solutions.

Many constabularies have worked hard during National Hate Crime Awareness Week over the last few years to promote public awareness about hate crime, encourage victims to report all hate crime to the police and partner with local organisations to reach out to vulnerable and marginalised communities. From our assessment of TRCs that are tailored to meet the needs of Muslim hate crime victims, much more needs to be done by PCCs to improve reporting centres that are known, trusted and accessible to Muslims.¹⁷

Promoting a virtuous cycle, where hate crime reporting engenders greater confidence and trust among victim groups to report hate crime through positive evaluation of the service and the quality of support offered, should be among the priorities advanced in local crime and policing strategies.

Commit to evaluating third party reporting centres and improve provisions for Muslims to report hate crime in their local area

Supporting victims of hate crime

Work has been done on this area by 13 out of 43 of the PCCs. A lot of support funding has been channelled into new victim support roles along with funding for local organisations which engage in this kind of activity. Significant efforts have been made to support victims of disability hate crime, homophobic hate crime, and sexual violence.

Support for victims of crime is a cross-cutting area which is not specific to hate crime, and consequently a number of PCCs who have not otherwise mentioned hate crime in their annual reports are represented in these numbers in relation to supporting victims of crime in general.

Only one force, Bedfordshire, explicitly mentioned work with Islamophobia-related organisations in relation to supporting victims of crime.

Other means of supporting hate crime victims has been undertaken in the form of victimisation surveys, to better identify victims needs. Some forces have launched hate crime hotlines, to provide victims with easier ways to report incidents. The roll out of social media applications for this purpose has been growing with forces in London (Self Evident), Birmingham (Eyewitness), Dorset (Helping victims of hate crime), Thames Valley (Hate Crime Network) and Hampshire (Helping victims of hate crime) all launching hate crime apps.

The True Vision app, available on the True Vision website which is run by ACPO (now the National Police Chiefs Council), has been downloaded 3,000 times. While True Vision serves as a filter for channelling hate crime incident reports to local forces, the work of local constabularies remains primary in addressing under-reporting of hate crime and making it easier for victims to avail themselves of means (such as social media apps) and methods (third party reporting centres) to report hate crime incidents.

Supporting victims also entails making them feel secure in those places which are often targeted

¹⁷ A recent good example is the launch of a hate crime hotline based at the Lancashire Council of Mosques. 'Islamophobia and hate crime helpline set up by mosques' charity', *BBC News* 10 February 2016

by individuals and groups motivated by anti-Muslim hostility. In a speech delivered in October 2015, the Prime Minister announced “New funding to be made available to boost security at faith establishments.”¹⁸ We look forward to PCCs supporting Muslim communities in accessing these funds and boosting security at mosques and Muslim schools.

Commit to supporting improvements to security at Islamic places of worship and Muslim schools.

Tackling the far right

Far right extremism continues to present a serious security threat to the UK although it is often underestimated in a climate where an excessive focus on al-Qaida inspired terrorism obscures the nature and scale of the threat posed by neo-Nazi groups and far right social movements.

The threat spans both terrorism incidents and incidents of serious assault and criminal damage, while on-street protests by far right groups bring low level intimidation, harassment and violence to Muslim communities around the country.

In recent years, the far right’s adoption of ‘cultural racism’ by which Muslims and Islam are portrayed as inimical to ‘British values’ and impervious to integration into the ‘British way of life’, has become more intense with significant animus directed at what they perceive as the ‘Islamisation’ of Britain. Though the revised Prevent strategy recommends police force areas to tackle ‘vulnerability to radicalisation’ for ‘all forms of extremism’, for Muslim communities, the threat posed by far right movements has long been regarded as insufficiently targeted in policy and by police.¹⁹

While protests in towns and cities across the UK is the dominant modus operandi for far right social movements, these groups are increasingly engaging in provocations such as handing out Bibles in mosques, running ‘Christian patrols’ in areas with a large Muslim population, door-stopping local Muslim politicians and harassing mosque worshippers on the pretext of tackling ‘Muslim grooming gangs’. The targeting of Muslim schools and of mosques, the latter on feminist grounds of challenging ‘gender apartheid,’ reveals the scale of intimidation and the palpable threat faced by Muslim communities.

The murder of Mohammed Saleem in April 2013 bears witness to the perils of racism and the ‘real threat’²⁰ posed by far right terrorism in the UK. Individuals bearing a far right disposition who have been convicted of serious crimes, such as Zack Davies, who brutally assaulted a Sikh dentist in a supermarket in retaliation for the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in January 2014, are stark reminders of the need to tackle all forms of extremism without fear or favour.

The rise of Pegida in Europe and the launch of its UK chapter, as well as the transnational networks that designate the virtual and physical space in which ‘counter jihad’ movements operate, raise new challenges for the police on tackling extremism at home.

The social media dimension of these networks, often enjoying online communities far greater in size than their physical manifestation in on-street protests and other forms of social mobilisation, point to growing concerns over hate speech online. Recent initiatives pushed by government and tentatively embraced by social media companies are steps in the right direction but the steps taken are neither uniform, across all strands of hate speech, nor to scale, given the sheer volume of communications exchanged on social media.

18. ‘I want to build a national coalition to challenge and speak out against extremism’, speech by Prime Minister David Cameron 13 October 2015

19. ‘Neo-Nazi lone-wolf attacks in Europe are more deadly than Isis-inspired terrorist plots’, *IB Times*, 1 March 2016

20. ‘UK ‘faces threat of murderous attack from Far Right extremist’’, *The Independent*, 13 March 2013

To estimate the number of far right protests occurring in the UK during the period in office of the first elected PCCs, we analysed local and national newspaper reports, anti-racism websites and the social media pages of far right groups to identify the date and location of protests targeting Muslim communities.

We logged incidents occurring between January 2013 and December 2015. We also sought information on the cost of policing far right protests during the PCCs' period in office and submitted Freedom of Information requests to all forces seeking a breakdown of the costs of policing protests by year. We also gathered information from open sources where available and in particular, for those forces which withheld information.

Appendix 1 shows the number of protests occurring during the period 2013-2015 where the protest was advertised as targeting Islam and Muslim communities, and the costs of policing far right demonstrations in the same period.

We found 40 protests took place in 2013, 36 in 2014 and 39 in 2015. Regions which saw the largest number of protests across all years were Greater Manchester, Hampshire, Northumbria, South Yorkshire, West Midlands and West Yorkshire. From the information we were able to derive through FOI or open source, the total cost for the three years was over £9.5 million.

When we evaluated the annual reports all PCCs for the years 2013 to 2015, we found, shockingly, that the far-right was mentioned in just one of all the PCC annual reports that we reviewed. City of London Police ran community events raising awareness of, and resilience against different kinds of extremism, including far right extremism.

The absence of further mentions in the annual reports of the 41 other forces does not in itself mean that they are unaware of the threat, or not taking action. For example Dudley police have done some excellent work with relation to EDL rallies through their town²¹ and a number of similar community-building examples have been reported in the press. In other instances, police chiefs have addressed the importance of tackling far right extremism on par with all other forms of extremist groups and associated activity.²²

However the fact that only one PCC mentioned far right extremism – which has been on the rise with a proliferation of organisations such as the English Defence League, Britain First, and Pegida UK – does raise concerns about an apparent lack of concern and priority for an issue that is of growing concern to Muslim communities.

The number of protests we have logged and the range of groups active in local areas, as well as the costs diverted from local force budgets to policing protests by groups intent on dividing communities and intimidating British Muslims, illustrates why concerted action is needed by PCCs and local forces on tackling the far right.

Social media and the use of online forums to organise and agitate against British Muslim communities, and to incite anti-Muslim hatred, must be taken more seriously as the growth in far right communities online escalates.

Commit to addressing the threat posed by far right groups and right wing extremism, including on-street protests and social media forums that foment anti-Muslim prejudice.

21. 'Dudley residents heap praise on police following EDL protest', *Dudley News*, 26 February 2015.

22. English Defence League and British National Party as dangerous as Isis, warn Derbyshire Police, *IB Times*, 18 February 2016.



Muslim graves desecrated in Newport cemetery

Swastikas and the initials NF (National Front), BNP (British National Party) and UKIP (UK Independence Party) were also painted onto the headstones.

Source:
<http://mend.org.uk/muslim-graves-desecrated-in-newport-cemetery/>



Community policing

In our 2012 manifesto, we put forward arguments for the reform of stop and search powers evidencing the disproportionate use of the powers against Black and Minority Ethnic communities (BME) relative to their size in the general population and the low stop-to-arrest ratio.

In 1999, the MacPherson report made 70 recommendations to, among other things, improve trust and confidence in policing among minority ethnic communities with proposals ranging from racial awareness training for officers, complaints procedures and disciplinary protocols to tackle racism in police forces and for forces to reflect the cultural and ethnic mix of the communities they serve. Among recommendations advanced was recording data on the use of stop and search procedures and monitoring stops for bias.²³

Since the publication of the MacPherson report, ethnic minorities have been shown to be disproportionately affected by stop and search with the ratio of Black to White stops increasing from 5 to 1 in 1999 to 6.59 to 1 between 2010/11. The figure decreased slightly at 5.93 to 1 in 2011/12 falling to 4.25 to 1 in 2014/15.

In 2012, research conducted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission on stop and search powers under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act found that the powers were being used disproportionately against people of ethnic minority backgrounds in police forces across Britain. It revealed that between 2008 and 2011 Black people experienced the highest rate of stop and search each year in that period.²⁴ Similarly, in 2013, the EHRC concluded that during 2010/11 and 2011/12 Black people were 29 times more likely than their White counterparts to be stopped and searched in the West Midlands.²⁵

In the year ending March 2015, stops and searches involving individuals belonging to BME groups fell by 68% from year ending March 2011.²⁶ However, BME groups were twice as likely to be stopped and searched as their White counterparts. In 2015, Black (or British Black) ethnicities were still over 4 times more likely to be stopped and searched, compared to over 6 times in 2011.²⁷

Of the 539,788 stops and searches conducted by the year ending March 2015, 74,680 led to an arrest; an arrest rate of 14%. The rate is a 2% increase on the previous year, and despite it being the highest arrest rate since current data collection began, the rate remains pitifully low and an ongoing challenge to good community relations between minority ethnic communities and local police forces.

Race and disproportionate use of stop and search powers on BME groups

Since 2010, in a bid to improve relations with ethnic minorities and to address the problem of community impact and alienation, the number of stop and searches by police forces has fallen significantly from 1,284,025 in 2010 to 541,000 in 2015, a 58% decrease and continuing a year on year decline since 2011.

While total figures have fallen sharply, levels of disproportionality persist and the different stop and search powers have differing negative impacts on minority communities. For example, Section 60 stop and search powers are more likely to affect Black individuals while Section 43 and Schedule 7 stops are more likely to affect individuals of Asian and Other backgrounds.

The disproportionate targeting of ethnic minorities in stop and search is also evident when

23. MacPherson Report (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report.

24. Equality and Human Rights Commission (2012) *Race disproportionality in stops and searches under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994*, p. 21.



25. Equality and Human Rights Commission. (2013). *Race Disproportionately in Stops and Searches 2011-12*. p. 33.

26. Home Office (November 2015) *Police powers and procedures, England and Wales, year ending 31 March 2015*.

27. Ibid

comparing the figures with resident population size. Based on a comparison of stop and search with the resident population in England and Wales during 2010/11, research has shown that the stop and search rate for White people was 17 stops per 1,000 of the population compared to 112 stops for Black people. In 2011/12, the stop and search rate for White people was 16 stops per 1,000 of the population compared to 95 stops for Black people. In 2014/15, the stop and search rate for White people was 8 stops per 1,000 of the compared with 34 stops for Black people, a dramatic improvement.

Figure 2 Stop and search per 1,000 population by ethnicity in England and Wales between 2010/11-2014/15



Source: Operation of Police Powers, England and Wales: September 2015 (Home Office, 2015)³⁰
As in previous years, the Home Office revealed an increase in the number of ethnic minorities

28. Ibid

29. Home Office (2015) *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes, and stop and search, Great Britain, quarterly update to September 2015.*

30. Home Office (2015) *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes, and stop and search, Great Britain, quarterly update to September 2015.*

stopped and searched under Section 43 between July-September 2014 and July-September 2015, compared to those who self-defined as White. Most noticeably, stops and searches involving individuals who self-defined as Asian or Asian British saw the largest increase, a 53% rise from the previous year.

A revised Code of Practice came into effect in March 2015 in relation to stop and search under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE)³¹, which continues to account for the greater proportion of all stops and search, and in 2012, upon the enactment of the Protection of Freedoms Act, which abrogated the powers contained in Section 44 and replaced these with Section 47A, a Code of Practice was issued in relation to Section 43 and 47A stops and search. The revised Codes emphasise the importance of observing the threshold on ‘reasonable suspicion’ at all times when conducting stops to maintain public confidence in policing and for compliance with the Equality Act (2010).

Schedule 7

Examinations under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 allow border officials and police officers to stop and search individuals travelling through ports, airports, international rail stations or the border area. However, unlike sections 43 and 47A, the requirement for ‘reasonable suspicion’ does not apply to Schedule 7 stops. The table below illustrates stops conducted under Schedule 7 up to September 2015 comparing it to the previous 12 month period. Though White individuals are numerically greater in number relative to other ethnic groups, comparisons based on resident populations reveals the extent of the disproportionality in the use of the powers.

Despite Muslims making up only 5% of the general population in the UK, when comparing the number of stops experienced relative to their size in the resident population, the disproportional number of stops impacting on Muslims becomes apparent. Our analysis of Schedule 7 stops in 2012 found that almost 1 in 5 (22.9%) Muslims were likely to be examined for under an hour, more than 1 in 3 (35.9%) were likely to be examined for over an hour and 2 out of 5 of those detained under Schedule 7 were likely to be Muslim (41.9%).³² David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, observed that ethnic minority groups made up a huge proportion of those detained noting that during 2009-10, ethnic minority groups made up the majority of those examined and 92% of those detained.³³

The Independent Reviewer also noted that Schedule 7 detentions and examinations were imposed upon members of ethnic minority groups to a greater extent than “their presence in the travelling population would seem to warrant.”³⁴

Figure 4 Examinations made under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 based on self-defined ethnicity




Figure 5 Detentions made under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 based on self-defined ethnicity


31. CODE A: Revised Code of Practice for the exercise by: Police Officers of Statutory Powers of stop and search Police Officers and Police Staff of requirements to record public encounters. Home Office, 2014.

32. MEND (2012) Consultation response on Schedule 7 stop and search.

33. David Anderson QC Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (2011) *The Terrorism Acts in 2011*. p. 105.

34. David Anderson QC Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (2011) *The Terrorism Acts in 2011*. p. 105.


ethnicity



'Suspect community'

An experimental analysis conducted by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) to determine the prevalence of race disproportionality in the practice of Schedule 7 stop and search powers found that Asian and Other ethnic groups were 11.3 times more likely than White people to be stopped and questioned.³⁵ Comparatively, Black people were 6.3 times more likely, while individuals of Mixed race background were 3.6 times more likely to be stopped and questioned than White people. In 2011/12 Asians or Other ethnic groups were 50.7 times more likely to be examined for over an hour at ports compared to their White counterparts. In comparison, Black people were 31.2 times more likely, while people of a Mixed Race were 10.4 times more likely to be examined for over an hour at ports than White people.

Figure 6 Race disproportionality ratios for total examinations at all ports, for three ethnic groups compared with the white group, 2010/11-2012/13




Source: Equality and Human Rights Commission³⁶

35. Equality and Human Rights Commission (2013) *An Experimental Analysis of Examinations and Detentions under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000*. p. 7.

36. Equality and Human Rights Commission (2013) *An Experimental Analysis of Examinations and Detentions under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000*. p. 23

Figure 7 Race disproportionality ratios for examinations at airports: all examinations, over the hour examinations and detentions, for three ethnic groups each compared with the white group, 2010/11



Source: Equality and Human Rights Commission³⁷

The analysis by the EHRC found that while the total number of examinations of Asians or other ethnic minorities at all ports and airports in 2010/11 was 46.6%, the figure increased to 63.5% when only taking stops and search at airports into consideration.

Further analysis found that 65.2% of over the hour examinations and detentions at all ports and airports were of Asian or Other ethnic minorities. The study also found that Pakistani, African and 'Other' ethnic groups experienced the highest number of over an hour examinations and detentions with Pakistanis 135.9 more likely to be questioned and 154.5 times more likely to be detained than their White counterparts.³⁸

The tables below, representing figures on Schedule 7 stops up to March 2015 show that individuals of Asian and Other background continue to be over-represented in the number of under the hour and over an hour examinations relative to their size in the resident population and in the travelling population.³⁹ The two categories are the principal ethnic groups which Muslims are most likely to fall within.

Table 4

Schedule 7 Examinations by ethnicity, Examined less than 1 hour					
Ethnicity/percentage	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
White	47%	46%	42%	46%	39%
Black	8%	8%	8%	8%	7%
Asian	26%	25%	22%	19%	23%
Other	16%	16%	17%	16%	18%
Mixed/not stated	4%	5%	11%	12%	13%

Table 5

Schedule 7 Examinations by ethnicity, Examined more than 1 hour					
Ethnicity/percentage	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
White	14%	12%	14%	12%	11%
Black	15%	14%	14%	13%	10%
Asian	45%	36%	33%	34%	36%
Other	20%	24%	25%	26%	26%
Mixed/not stated	6%	14%	15%	14%	17%

37. *ibid.*

38. *ibid* p25

39. Anderson, D. (2015). *The Terrorism Acts in 2014: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006*. pg 27


Table 6

Individuals detained under Schedule 7					
Ethnicity/percentage	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
White	8	8	9	11	11
Black	21	23	22	18	12
Asian	45	35	31	35	35
Other	21	23	22	22	27
Mixed/not stated	5	11	16	14	15

In his 2014 annual review of the Operation of Terrorism Powers, the Independent Reviewer noted a fall in the use of Schedule 7 powers observing that “the temptation to pointless examinations is being largely resisted, and that examinations - whether or not based on specific intelligence - are becoming increasingly targeted.”⁴⁰


Despite a decline in the number of stops and searches under Schedule 7 powers since 2011, as well as a fall in the number of people examined across all ethnic groups in the year ending September 2015, Asians or British Asians saw a 2% increase on the previous year. Comparatively, the most notable falls were found for White and Black or Black British groups, who saw respective falls of 37% and 30%. Detentions increased for White groups by 269% compared with an 180% increase for Asians or Asian British groups between September 2014 to September 2015; 676 individuals of Asian or Asian British background were detained compared to 214 individuals from a White background.

Figure 8



40. *ibid*, p 26

Figure 9



Though in his 2014 review, the Independent Reviewer did not take the view that the number of individuals from Asians and Other groups represented in the Schedule 7 examinations and detentions amounted to evidence the powers were being “used in a racially discriminatory manner,” he did concede that the power “continues to be a source of considerable irritation for some travellers of all ethnicities; and arrest rates remain very low indeed by the standards of stop and search.”⁴¹

The powers do more than present “a source of considerable irritation” for Muslim travellers with a 2013 report commissioned by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission on the impact of counter-terrorism policies on Muslim communities noting:

“Individuals recalled being asked questions relating to their religious and political beliefs, as well as their personal activities in their communities. One interviewee recalls being questioned about his understanding of jihad; another about polygamy and his views of different political Islamic organisations and Muslim community groups. Such questions led most to feel that they were being targeted as Muslims, and that the questions were being used to build up profiles of them and to gather information in general about Muslim communities.”⁴²

In a dissenting opinion published in the legal judgment of *DPP vs Beghal*, involving Sylvie Beghal, a French national living in the UK who was held at East Midlands Airport under Schedule 7 in January 2011 after arriving on a flight from Paris, Lord Kerr demurring from the majority opinion argued that there existed “common features” between Schedule 7 powers and the abrogated Section 44 powers which were deemed by the European Court of Human Rights to be not “in accordance with the law.” Lord Kerr further argued that the Schedule 7 powers presented the potential for “direct discrimination [which is] entirely at odds with the notion of an enlightened, pluralistic society all of whose members are treated equally” even if the Code of Practice forbade its use against individuals based on their racial and/or religious identity or perceived identity.⁴³ The caution to potential misuse of the powers for ‘racial profiling’ is an important reminder of compliance with the revised Code of Practice and the Equality Act (2010).

41. Anderson, D. (2015). *The Terrorism Acts in 2014: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006*. pg 27

42. Choudhury, T. and H. Fenwick. (2011). *Equality and Human Rights Commission Research report 72: The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities*. p. 23

43. *Beghal v Director of Public Prosecutions* (2015). Available at: <https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2013-0243-judgment.pdf>

In 2014, following a consultation on the use of Schedule 7 powers, the Government introduced amendments to the powers in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act. The amendments did not enforce a “reasonable suspicion” threshold in the use of the powers but did introduce changes such as reducing the maximum examination period in detention from 9 to 6 hours; granting individuals detained access to legal counsel; and repealed powers to take ‘intimate samples’ of biometric data.

While these changes have been welcome, the experimental analysis on Schedule 7 powers prior to the legislative changes raises palpable concerns about a ‘Muslim penalty’ experienced by travellers passing through UK ports and airports and the conspicuous costs of ‘flying while Muslim’.

Reforming Stop and Search

Evidence that 1.2 million stops and searches conducted in 2012 resulted in an arrest rate of less than 9%, prompted the Home Secretary to announce a consultation to review police powers to stop and search suspects noting concerns that the powers were being used too liberally and were damaging community relations.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies published its report in 2013 observing that over a quarter of all stop and search (27%) were regarded as “unlawful”⁴⁴ noting that the powers were not sufficiently supervised and many stop and search incidents were not recorded properly. 30 out of 43 forces in England and Wales were found to be using stop and search powers improperly showing little regard for the impact on communities, particularly Black and Minority Ethnic communities. HMIC put forward 10 recommendations to assess force performance on the use of stop and search.

The HMIC report was followed by another publication by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission in 2013, which reasserted the disproportionate use of stop and search powers against members of the BME population.⁴⁵

The Government has taken strong measures to address the rate of disproportionality and the low stop to arrest ratio introducing a new ‘Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme’ in April 2014. The aim of the scheme is to “achieve greater transparency, community involvement in the use of stop and search powers and to support a more intelligence-led approach, leading to better outcomes, for example, an increase in the stop and search to positive outcome ratio.”

Other efforts to increase transparency include the publication of online data on stop and search by 40 constabularies in England and Wales, including the British Transport Police.⁴⁶ The published data includes map-based information showing details of the ethnicity, gender and age range of those who are stopped and searched alongside crime data on the website www.police.uk. The data is available on the website on a monthly basis.

In August 2015, HMIC published a follow up report that investigated the progress made by police forces since the initial report in 2013.⁴⁷ The report detailed in-depth findings on eight police forces including, Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Greater Manchester Police, Hertfordshire, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), Northumbria Police, South Wales Police and West Yorkshire Police. HMIC revealed that considerable improvements had been made in the way stop and search procedures were being implemented.

However, it was also revealed that police forces were still overlooking basic measures that could improve the way the powers were used. For example, Cambridgeshire and Northumbria Police still

44. HM Inspectorate of Constabularies (2013) *Stop and Search Powers: Are the police using them effectively and fairly?* p. 9.

45. Equality and Human Rights Commission (2013) *Race Disproportionately in Stops and Searches, 2011-12.* p. 33.

46. ‘Police Commissioner Sue Mountstevens welcomes more transparency over “stop and search”, *Bristol Post*, 31 January 2015

47. HM Inspectorate of Constabularies (2015) *Stop and search powers 2: are the police using them effectively and fairly?*

did not have a definition of what constituted an effective use of stop and search. Additionally, officers at Cambridgeshire Police suggested guidelines provided by the Home Office on the 'Best use of stop and search' powers were not communicated effectively to frontline staff and the force had not carried out any recent analytical work to determine if stop and search powers were being used fairly.

In February 2016, HMIC published the Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy (PEEL) reports, covering all 43 constabularies in England and Wales. The report found that forces continue to be let down by poor practice in the use of stop and search. Only 11 of the 43 forces were found to be complying fully with the Best Use of Stop and Search scheme. Nearly two thirds of forces were not complying with the requirement to record and publish the complete range of outcomes which could follow from a stop and search encounter whilst 11 forces were not actively monitoring the impact of stop and search powers on both BME groups and young people.

In response to the PEEL reports, 13 constabularies were suspended from the 'Best Use of Stop and Search' scheme: Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, Cumbria, Gloucestershire, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northumbria, South Wales, Staffordshire, Warwickshire, West Mercia and Wiltshire.

Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service has acknowledged views of the police as 'institutionally racist' given the disproportionate use of stop and search against BME people with no discernible explanation for the cause. The Metropolitan Police Service recently announced that all its officers are to undergo training to tackle "unconscious bias" as a means of improving stop and search practices.

Commit to enforcing the 10 recommendations proposed by HMIC on improving the use of stop and search and compliance with the 'Best use of stop and search scheme'.

Among other improvements that have steadily emerged in response to the evidence about disproportionate use of stop and search powers on ethnic minorities, the College of Policing introduced a pilot programme, devised by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, to tackle 'unconscious bias' among police officers. The pilot, which commenced in September 2015, involved six force areas, the Metropolitan Police Service, Cleveland, Sussex, Thames Valley, Greater Manchester and the British Transport Police, and ran until October 2015. The pilot was designed to undertake assessment to evaluate whether:

- the training changed the way officers approach stop and search
- the 'hit rates' improved (where an item is found on a person)
- the quality of the grounds for stopping someone improved

In February 2016, the Metropolitan Police Service announced that all 32,000 of its officers would undergo the training if the pilot results proved successful in tackling 'unconscious bias'.⁴⁸

Improving the use of stop and search and raising the stop-to-arrest ratio requires intelligence-led policing, better knowledge about what constitutes "reasonable suspicion" and demonstrable evidence that 'unconscious bias' is not affecting police perceptions of probable criminal behaviour.

The pilot initiated by the EHRC is a commendable contribution to this end and all forces should be encouraged to enrol officers on the training programme if the evaluation shows positive results.

Commit to train officers in detecting 'unconscious bias' to improve stop and search 'hit rates' and consistently demonstrate grounds for 'reasonable suspicion'

48. All 32,000 Met officers sent on course to detect 'unconscious' race prejudice, *London Evening Standard*, 18 February 2016



Diversity in policing

The MacPherson report in 1999 iterated a concern about the low level of BME representation in the police force. One of the recommendations proposed in the Cattle report into the race riots in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in the summer of 2001, was the need for “new and radical measures” for BME recruitment to the police.


Since the publication of the MacPherson report, ethnic minority officers within police forces in England and Wales have not substantially increased. This was exemplified in a Home Affairs Committee report in 2013, which revealed that of the 134,101 officers in the police force, only 6,615 (4%) were from ethnic minority backgrounds with only a 1% increase in the number of minority ethnic officers recruited to the force between March 2011 and March 2012.⁴⁹

More recently, Home Office figures for March 2013 revealed that there were 6,555 BME police officers in the 43 forces of England and Wales, accounting for 5% of all officers, a figure that remained unchanged on the previous year. Between 2013 and 2015, a small increase in the proportion of BME officers recruited to the force was observed though the 6% rate reached remained lower than the 7% target set by the Home Office.

In the last decade, the number of BME officers has doubled from 3% to 6% though this is far lower than the proportion of BME people in the general population: 14.1%.

In 2015, of all 43 police forces, the Metropolitan Police Service had the largest proportion of BME police officers (11.7%) though the proportion of London’s population that is from BME background is 40.2%. West Midlands Police came second with 8.6% followed by Leicestershire 7.2%. Again, both conurbations have BME populations greater in size than the number of BME people in the police force. Cheshire Police (0.6%), Dyfed-Powys Police (0.7%) and North Wales Police (0.8%) had the lowest proportion of BME officers within their ranks (see Appendix 2).

Figure 10 Minority Ethnic officers as a proportion of all officers as at 31 March 2003 to 2015, in the 43 police forces of England and Wales (excluding central service secondments)



Source: Police workforce, England and Wales: 31 March 2015 (Home Office, 28 January 2016)⁵⁰

49. Home Affairs Committee (2013) *Third Report: Leadership and standards in the police: ethnic make-up by police force*.

50. Home Office (2016) Police workforce, England and Wales. Downloaded from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2015-data-tables>

Individuals from BME groups also made up a disproportionately small number of officers in senior roles within police forces in England and Wales. In 2015, less than 5% of chief superintendents were from minority ethnic backgrounds and only 1% of chief officers.

Table 7 Police officers in post (full-time equivalents) by self-identified ethnicity (percentages), England and Wales as at 31 March 2011–2015

	White	Black	Asian	Mixed	Chinese or Other	Not Stated	Total
2011	95.2%	1.0%	1.9%	1.3%	0.5%	1.2%	143,730
2012	95%	1.1%	2%	1.4%	0.6%	1.4%	139,110
2013	94.9%	1.1%	2%	1.5%	0.6%	1.5%	134,100
2014	94.7%	1.1%	2.1%	1.5%	0.6%	1.7%	129,580
2015	94.4%	1.1%	2.2%	1.6%	0.6%	1.6%	127,910


Source: Based on Ministry of Justice⁵¹

Recruitment

In relation to the recruitment process, there was an increase in the number of BME applicants to the force from 8.4% of total applicants in 2003/04 to 12.3% in the first half of 2007/08. The proportion of those who were successful in their applications also increased from 6.3% to 10.7% of the total number of candidates.

However, comparing recruitment figures between 2006/07, when 8,671 full time ethnic minority officers were recruited, and 2010/11, when 2,197 full time ethnic minority officers were recruited, there has been a decrease of nearly 75%. A freedom of information request in 2015 revealed that White applicants had a better chance of gaining a job than someone from an ethnic minority in more than two-thirds of the UK's forces.⁵² This reinforces data revealed in 2015 which found that ethnic minorities were under represented in police forces across England and Wales and had less of a chance of gaining a job than their White counterparts when they did apply.

Figure 11 Proportion of police officers who are Minority Ethnic, by rank, as at 31 March 2015, England and Wales




Source: Based on Ministry of Justice statistics⁵³

51. Ministry of Justice (2015) *Race and the criminal justice system in 2014*.

52. 'Most UK police forces have disproportionate number of white officers', *The Guardian*, 1 January 2016

53. *Ibid*

Figure 12 Police officers in England and Wales, based on self-defined ethnicity, as at 31 March 2015



Source: Police workforce, England and Wales: 31 March 2015 (Home Office, 28 January 2016)⁵⁴

Data also shows that 32 out of 45 police forces appoint a greater proportion of white applicants than those from BME backgrounds. In the Metropolitan Police Service, 28.1% of applications came from BME groups, though only 17% of these were employed.

In 2015, this led to recruitment campaigns by various forces to recruit more officers from ethnic minority groups and a proposal from the chief constable of Cheshire Police to change the law to allow for 'positive discrimination' in favour of individuals from BME groups in the recruitment process.⁵⁵ The Metropolitan Police Service also revealed that following a recruitment campaign that involved a ban on hiring officers who do not live in London, they have managed to double the number of BME recruits to the force between June and August 2015.⁵⁶

Forces which organised recruitment drives to increase the number of BME officers between 2013-15 include: Northamptonshire, Metropolitan Police Service, Surrey, Northumbria, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Nottinghamshire, South Wales, Thames Valley, Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands Cambridgeshire, Avon and Somerset, Wiltshire and Gwent.

Retention

The Equalities and Human Rights Commission revealed that there was a higher resignation rate among BME officers than their White counterparts, particularly in the first six months of service.⁵⁷ For officers with under six months service, approximately 6.1% of those who resigned or were dismissed in 2007 were from BME groups. In comparison, the resignation rate for White officers was approximately 3.1%.

In our 2015 general election manifesto, we highlighted the problem of low recruitment and retention of officers from BME backgrounds in police forces in England and Wales, as well as the low level of BME officers represented at senior rank.

The Conservative Party's 2015 election manifesto stated the party's desire to "transform the relationship between the police and the public" by improving the diversity of police recruitment, "especially of black and ethnic minority officers" through new initiatives, such as "Police Now" (a fast-track entry scheme into the police force for graduates).⁵⁸

54. Home Office (2016) Police workforce, England and Wales.

55. 'Police chief with no black officers open to positive discrimination,' The Guardian, 22 October 2015

56. 'Scotland Yard doubles number of ethnic minority recruits', London Evening Standard, 16 September 2016.

57. Bennetto, J. (2009). Equality and Human Rights Commission. Police and Racism: What has been achieved 10 years after the Stephen Lawrence inquiry report?

58. Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 2015.

The Labour Party manifesto supported the introduction of affirmative action policies to improve BME recruitment within police forces.⁵⁹

The Liberal Democrats also expressed support for improving diversity in policing through “recruit[ing] more Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic police officers.”⁶⁰

With the announcement of the Vision 2020 strategy and the BME Progression 2018 programme by the College of Policing, a concerted effort is being made to increase diversity in policing including through the extension of existing mentoring programmes, evaluating ‘unconscious bias’ in the recruitment process and using Positive Action initiatives to enhance perceptions of the police service as valuing diversity. These initiatives are to be strongly encouraged and we ask PCCs to commit to following through with clear action plans on the recruitment, retention and promotion of BME officers.

Commit to increasing recruitment, retention and promotion of BME officers with clear plans to improve diversity at senior rank.

Independent Advisory Groups and ‘critical incidents’

As a means of supporting community engagement and to enhance co-operation with communities in sensitive areas of policing, Independent Advisory Groups have been established at force level since the MacPherson report advised their creation to improve the quality of contact between police forces and the communities they serve.

In guidance first issued in 2008 in relation to IAGs, the Association of Chief Police Officers noted their value describing them as “a key strand of community engagement”. IAGs play a vital role in providing police forces with a forum for listening to community concerns and help “anticipate how police responses to policing problems may be interpreted by different communities.” IAGs serve as ‘critical friends’ to police forces and can play a useful role during ‘critical incidents,’ where a policing operation has the potential to affect community relations, as well as providing public scrutiny of, for example, a force’s record on stop and search and tackling hate crime.

Critical incidents can include far right protests and other forms of social agitation that threaten to provoke violence and community tensions. IAGs serve as a means to enhance community confidence by providing regular, sustained contact between a police force and its local communities.

IAGs are composed of individuals drawn from local communities and are intended to be a reflection of the local demographic profile with representation from various minority and other groups. Many forces have details of how individuals can apply to join an IAG on their constabulary website.

To assess the quality of representation of Muslim concerns on IAGs via the membership of Muslim individuals who live and work within local communities, we submitted FOIs to all forces requesting details about the number of IAGs established within the force area and the number of Muslim individuals represented on these.

The majority of forces declined to respond with details citing non-disclosure under data protection rules. Those that did respond with details are shown in the table below, alongside group membership information that we were able to derive from open sources.

59. Labour Party General Election Manifesto 2015.

60. Liberal Democrats General Election Manifesto 2015.

Table 8 Independent Advisory Groups and membership, by constabulary

	How Many IAGs in force area	IAG members of
Avon and Somerset	9	5
Bedfordshire	3	Not disclosed
Cambridgeshire	Not disclosed	Not disclosed
Cheshire	1	1
Cleveland	4	Not disclosed
Cumbria	4	Not disclosed
Derbyshire	1	Not disclosed
Devon and Cornwall	Not disclosed	Not disclosed
Dorset	4	Not disclosed
Durham	3	Not disclosed
Dyfed-Powys	1	0
Essex	5	Not disclosed
Gloucestershire	1	Not disclosed
Greater Manchester	13	Not disclosed
Gwent	1	Not disclosed
Hampshire	12	Not disclosed
Hertfordshire	Disbanded	0
Humberside	3	Not disclosed
Kent	14 (currently being restructured)	Not disclosed
Lancashire	3	5
Leicestershire	3	0
Lincolnshire	3	Not disclosed
Merseyside	2	Not disclosed
Metropolitan Police Service	Not disclosed	Not disclosed
Norfolk	1	0
North Wales	13	Not disclosed
North Yorkshire	4	Not disclosed
Northamptonshire	4	Not disclosed
Northumbria	Not disclosed	Not disclosed
Nottinghamshire	4	6
South Wales	Not disclosed	Not disclosed
South Yorkshire	5	Not disclosed
Staffordshire	1	1
Suffolk	1	Not disclosed
Surrey	1	1
Sussex	8	Not disclosed
Thames Valley	7	Not disclosed
Warwickshire	4	Not disclosed
West Mercia	3	1
West Midlands	10	4
West Yorkshire	7	Not disclosed
Wiltshire	0	0

It is surprising, given the role played by a member of an IAG in representing the concerns of a minority group, that membership from Muslim communities was not made available. In the interests of transparency and to ensure that Muslim communities feel adequately represented in IAG forums, police forces should make the composition of IAGs and the type of group representation therein openly available to local communities. We deem this all the more important given concerted efforts among some forces to actively recruit from minority groups, including Muslims.

In our 2012 PCC manifesto, we encouraged PCCs to establish forums for engaging local Muslim communities in discussions about local policing and crime reduction. We repeat that recommendation and urge forces to widen participation from Muslims in IAGs in their local area.

Commit to improving Muslim participation in consultative forums including in Independent Advisory Groups

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Crime and security

One of the most contentious areas of policing in relation to Muslim communities remains the role of officers in the delivery of the Prevent strand of the counter terrorism strategy.

The introduction of a new statutory duty on Prevent in the Counter Terrorism and Security Act, 2015 (CTS) has placed further strain on an already troubled relationship. The treatment of Muslim communities under the prism of security and the experience of being a ‘suspect community’, evidenced in the extent of racial profiling observable in stop and search powers exercised under terrorism legislation, has contributed to unease about new aspects of the counter terrorism strategy and the “drift towards a police state”.

The lack of definitional clarity over the concept of ‘British values’, which lies at the heart of the counter terrorism strategy and which influences the parameters of assessed vulnerability adds to the confusion and condescension with which the Prevent policy is viewed by critics. The inchoate conception of ‘British values’ is just one of many criticisms advanced in assessments that conclude the policy is counter-productive to its objectives.

Rejection of a linear theory of progression and any causal relationship between non-violent to violent extremism and the low level of confidence among Muslim communities of an evidence based approach informing policy development in the field of counter-terrorism has compounded problems experienced at the operational level. The new duty has further heightened fears that the balance between liberty and security has been firmly tipped in favour of the latter with a particular punitive impact on Muslim communities and their human rights. The new duty has been described as having a “chilling effect” on thoughts and behaviours of innocent British citizens with Muslim communities unfairly affected by a policy discourse that privileges al Qaida inspired terrorism in depictions of the security threat faced by the country over the very ‘real threat’ posed by others forms of terrorism, including far right extremism.

According to data compiled by Europol, ‘Islamist terrorism’ or ‘religiously inspired terrorism’ accounts for less than 1% of all terrorism attacks on the European mainland in the period 2006 - 2014. A recent report posited the number of terrorist attacks committed by lone actor terrorists in Europe between 2000 and 2015 as 1 in 3 (33%) compared 38% that were religiously-inspired.⁶¹ The neglect of the scale of the threat from far right extremism compounds fears among Muslim communities of a distorted focus on ‘Islamist’ terrorism and an asymmetric policy response to extant threats emanating from all forms of extremism.

Of the 183 inmates detained due to violent extremism in the year ending March 2014, 32% were classified as “domestic extremists” with domestic extremism arrests increasing by 50% in 2014.⁶² In fact, from 1990 to 2012, 249 people have died due to right-wing extremism in Europe, while 263 have died due to al-Qaida related extremism, showing that in the long run the two threats are roughly of the same magnitude.⁶³ However, the overwhelming focus of the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy is on “international terrorism.”⁶⁴

The widening of the scope of the Prevent duty and its placing on a statutory footing has prompted widespread disquiet about the role of officers as “thought police” in the delivery of the controversial Channel programme devised for the safeguarding of individuals suspected of vulnerability to

61. Smith, M. et al. (2016) *Lone Actor Terrorism: Policy Paper 3: Motivations, Political Engagement and Online Activity*. London: Institute of Strategic Dialogue.

62. Home Office Counter Terrorism Statistics 2014, accessible at <http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-financial-year-ending-march-2014/> [last accessed 18.08.15]

63. Kundnani, A. (2012). ‘*Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe*’ (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, May 2012)

64. Home Office Counter Terrorism Statistics (2014). *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops and searches, quarterly update to 31 December 2014*. Accessible at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-december-2014/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stops-and-searches-quarterly-update-to-31-d/> [last accessed 15.03.16]

radicalisation. The duty has since been expanded to cover a broader range of “specified authorities,” local authorities, schools, the health sector, prisons and probation services and the police. Deliberations during the passage of the Bill introducing the new statutory duty gave voice to fears of the encroachment on human rights and other freedoms, including academic freedom, if the duty were to be imposed. Those fears have since moved beyond the realm of the hypothetical with a rising number of cases coming to light of encroachments on freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly as well as associated rights pertaining to the duties placed on the education sector in equalities legislation (Equality Act, Part 6, Chapters 1-4) and in the education policy document, Every Child Matters.

Police forces have come under particular scrutiny in relation to the Prevent strategy given the proportion of the policy budget which is consumed by police forces relative to other agencies and because of the centrality of police forces to the delivery of Prevent. The Prevent guidance relating to the revised duties on specified authorities states the police “play a galvanising role in developing local Prevent partnerships and bring together a wide range of other organisations to support local delivery of Prevent” and that “a key objective for the police is to ensure that Prevent is embedded into all aspects of policing including patrol, neighbourhood and safeguarding functions.”

There are currently 50 Priority Areas identified for the purposes of Prevent with these classified as either ‘Tier 1’ or ‘Tier 2’. These 50 Priority Areas are directly monitored and assessed by the Home Office in delivery of Prevent. In the past, priority areas have been correlated to local Muslim population density. The present areas designated as Priority Areas are not published and it is difficult to determine whether a mapping of Prevent onto the population distribution of Muslim communities in the UK persists.

A concise summary of the failings of the Prevent strategy to date can be gleaned from the intervention of Labour MP, Diana Johnson, during a Commons debate about the statutory instruments relating to guidance on the new Prevent duty on 24 March 2015. Johnson reiterated the cumulative failures associated with the strategy stating:

“In 2010, they inherited 93 Prevent priority areas and in one year they cut them to 23. They then restored funding to seven areas, including Greenwich, to bring us back up to 30 priority areas. From next year, the Government will be increasing the number of priority areas to 50 and in their impact assessment on the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, the Government revealed that they expect this to rise to 90 areas over the next few years. In two years, then, we may be back where we started five years ago, but we have lost seven years thanks to the muddle coming from the Government.”⁶⁵

For Muslim communities, the muddle coming from Governments, both Labour and Conservative, has had far greater consequence than the passing of seven years in a policy fog. It has been meant almost 10 years of sustained assault during which Muslims have faced an escalating threat from the far right, suffered the indignity of incursions into the private sphere and matters of Islamic theology, experienced infringement of their civil and political rights and witnessed growing demonisation in the media of Islam and Muslims.

Analysis of print media output for the period 2010-2014 by Professors Tony McEnery and Paul Baker and commissioned by MEND found that the main context that Muslims and Islam were written about was related to conflict, similar to news output for the period 1998-2009. The analysis also found “When Muslims are discussed as a collective group the most salient pattern is in the context of the radicalisation of young British Muslims.”⁶⁶

65. *Hansard* (HC) 24 Mar 2015, vol 594 col 1380.

66. McEnery, T. and P Baker. (forthcoming). *The Representation of Islam in the British Press: 2010-2014*. (London: MEND)

Thought Police

A growing area of latent conflict between police forces and communities is in the delivery of the Channel programme. The extension of the statutory duty to cover universities and higher education institutes, and the role of officers in 'risk assessments' in relation to, for example, external speakers on campus, has broadened the sphere of potential conflict by stretching the scope of involvement of officers in determining 'risk'.

Channel is a police-coordinated, multi-agency partnership that evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, working alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels

The programme has, since its inception, faced criticism over its perceived interference in the private sphere with an Institute of Race Relations report in 2009 stating:

"There is strong evidence that a significant part of the Prevent programme involves the embedding of counter-terrorism police officers within the delivery of local services, the purpose of which seems to be to gather intelligence on Muslim communities, to identify areas, groups and individuals that are 'at risk' and to then facilitate interventions, such as the Channel programme, as well as more general police engagement with the Muslim community, to manage perceptions of grievances."⁶⁷

Channel was first piloted in 2007 and rolled out across England and Wales in April 2012. As a statutory duty on schools under CTS (2015) its scope has been considerably expanded.

Channel assesses vulnerability to radicalisation using vulnerability assessment framework built around three criteria. These are:

- Engagement with a group, cause or ideology;
- Intent to cause harm; and
- Capability to cause harm.

The three criteria form the basis of the Extremism Risk Guidance using 22 factors (ERG 22+) that can contribute to vulnerability; 13 are associated with engagement; 6 relate to intent and 3 to capability. It is instructive that the assessment criteria have not been published nor their validity subjected to open scrutiny.

The role of the police, who sit at the heart of the Channel programme, from compiling the preliminary assessment of an individual who is 'referred' (a euphemism for being identified as 'at risk') and sitting on the Multi Agency Safeguarding Hubs that deliberate the nature of the 'risk' and devise the appropriate model and length of interventionary support, present significant challenges to forces and their relationship with local communities.

Some of these challenges can be discerned from guidance on 'signs of radicalisation' which agencies have been advised to look out for including "showing a mistrust of mainstream media reports and belief in conspiracy theories" and "appearing angry about government policies, especially foreign policy".⁶⁸ A senior officer claimed "children as young as five" are at risk of radicalisation and there has also been suggestion that Muslims who "stop shopping at Marks & Spencer" may be vulnerable.

67. Kundnani, A. Spooked! (2009) *How not to Prevent Violent Extremism*. London: Institute of Race Relations., p. 6.

68. 'Young people who question Government or media may be extremists, officials tell parents' *The Independent*, 1 December 2015



Channel referrals


The risk to undermining trust and confidence in local forces is best captured in figures revealing the number of individuals who have been referred to Channel over the years, by age and by sector, and the huge volume of referrals which are rejected as ‘not at risk’.

We submitted FOIs to all police forces in England and Wales seeking a breakdown of Channel referrals over the period 2013 - 2015 by age and ethnicity. The majority of forces declined to disclose the information. The tables presented below are from an FOI submitted by the BBC and from data retrieved from the National Police Chiefs Council.

The figures show the huge surge in the number of referrals since the Coalition came to power in 2010 and since, with the exception of the year April 2011 - March 2012, when a slight reduction on the previous year took place.

Figures from a BBC FOI request submitted to the National Police Chiefs Council which we obtained shows the degree to which young children are affected by Channel referrals.

Figure 13 Channel referrals April 2007 - March 2014



Source: National Police Chiefs Council

Table 9 Individuals aged 10 and below who have been referred to the Channel programme since 2007

Date range	Referrals
2007 to 31/03/2012	52
01/04/2012 to 10/12/2015	415
Total	467

Table 10 Individuals aged 11 to 15 (inclusive) who have been referred to the Channel programme since 2007

Date range	Referrals
2007 to 31/03/2012	398
01/04/2012 to 10/12/2015	1424
Total	1822

Table 11 Individuals aged 11 to 15 (inclusive) who have been referred to the Channel programme April 2012 - 10 December 2015, by age

Age	Referrals
11	101
12	157
13	258
14	405
15	503
Total	1424

Table 12 Individuals aged 10 and below who have been referred to the Channel programme April 2012 - 10 Dec 2015, by CTU region

CTU Region	Referrals
North East	52
North West	86
West Midlands	126
East Midlands	44
Wales	6
Metropolitan Police	18
South East	27
South West	15
Eastern	41
Total	415

Table 13 Individuals aged 11 to 15 (inclusive) who have been referred to the Channel programme April 2012 - 10 Dec 2015 by CTU region

CTU Region	Referrals
North East	237
North West	267
West Midlands	283
East Midlands	127
Wales	14
Metropolitan Police	178
South East	141

South West	87
Eastern	90
Total	1424

Tables 12 and 13 show that referrals from CTU regions based in parts of the country with large Muslim population densities, the North West and West Midlands regions, accounted for 51% of referrals of children aged 10 and below and almost 40% of children aged 11 to 15 (inclusive) between April 2012 and 10 December 2015.

Table 14 Individuals aged 10 and below who have been referred to the Channel programme April 2012 - 10 Dec 2015, by profession of the person who made the referral

Sector (Profession)*	Referrals
Education	189
Faith institutions	1
Health	4
Local Authority	26
Public	1
National Offender Management	1
Police	29

Table 15 Individuals aged 11 to 15 (inclusive) who have been referred to the Channel programme April 2012 - 10 Dec 2015, by profession of the person who made the referral

Sector (Profession)*	Referrals
Education	582
Faith institutions	1
Health	10
Local Authority	69
Public	8
National Offender Management	1
Police	152
Community	4
Youth Offending	27

* This is a non-mandatory field and therefore is not always completed.

The non-mandatory requirement in filling the field on sector/profession of the person who made the referral shows the extent to which data capture and disclosure on Channel referrals remains a problem. From 2014/15, the Home Office has taken over the duty to publish Channel referral information. This move is consistent with other aspects of the new Prevent duty and guidance which evinces a centralisation of power away from local forces to the Home Office.

The Channel referral figures presented above reveal the significant proportion of referrals made from the Education sector, accounting for 75% of referrals for children aged 10 and below and 68% of children aged 11 to 15 (inclusive) between April 2012 and 10 December 2015 among cases where the profession of the person making the referral was known.

Linked to the problem of schools compromising the learning environment as a safe space for young

people, is the issue of teachers being turned into ‘spies’ and being forced to monitor their pupils for ‘signs of radicalisation’. The extent of ‘thought-policing’ that this entails and the creation of this ‘pre-criminal space’ – where no criminal offence is committed but a lingering doubt based on dubious training on the ‘signs of radicalisation’ – means that pupils are at threat of being deemed guilty of a probable crime without sufficient safeguards against wrongful detection and referral. The ‘risk assessment’ tools used in this exercise, from the Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) training provided to teachers to the software packages which automate the process by documenting keyword searches of words like ‘jihad’, ‘caliphate’ etc on classroom computers, are being used to construct this ‘pre-criminal space’. The means and the process raise serious questions about proportionality and the unintended consequences of a response that affirms perceptions of ‘institutionalised Islamophobia’.

Commit to publishing comprehensive data on Channel referrals annually on the constabulary and police.uk websites.

The lack of transparency over training providers and the quality of training offered further cements the frustration felt by Muslim communities with Prevent. As with those selected to deliver ‘de-radicalisation’ packages or ‘one to one mentoring’ as part of a supportive intervention devised by a Multi Agency Supporting Hub, the lack of openness about who delivers the training, what the training consists of and quality assurance processes, to evaluate the effectiveness and relevance of the materials, contributes to the sense of unease. An absence of transparency and public scrutiny of Prevent delivery engenders fear and mistrust.

There is a deep tension that is manifesting itself in classrooms across the country with Muslim pupils and parents feeling the burden of the Prevent policy amid claims of Muslim pupils being:

- Harassed by Prevent officers without parental consent⁶⁹;
- Stigmatised when expressing innocent and legitimate remarks or comments and political views being used by teachers as a basis to ‘refer’ pupils to Prevent officers for ‘risk assessment’ prior to being formerly engaged in the Channel programme;
- Discriminatory conduct by schools with the Bureau of Investigative Journalism uncovering evidence of schools in Barnsley, an area with a history of far right extremism, discriminately applying the risk assessment tools on radicalisation to BME pupils ignoring the dangers of far right extremism to pupils of White British backgrounds.⁷⁰

Universities are another setting in which the Prevent policy has garnered strong criticism over its curtailment of academic freedom and its perverse logic of deploying a “counter-narrative” to extremist speech by placing onerous burdens on “censoring” speaker material.

The role of the police in informing ‘risk assessments’ devised by HEIs and the employment of a Prevent officer to enforce compliance with the new statutory duty evinces the state of paranoia in which the “pre-criminal space” expands out further to encroach upon learning environments and the vital role they play in fostering critical thinking skills.

While the importance of safeguarding duties cannot be underestimated, nor the necessity of supporting those who display tendencies that give rise to demonstrable concerns about the probability of harm, to oneself and/or to others, the unintended consequences of misplaced judgments and heavy handed interventions are as serious in consequence as the high proportion of

69. CAGE briefing, March 2016

70. Newman, M. (2015). *Preventing far right extremism? Schools in EDL and BNP heartland only monitoring ethnic minority pupils*. (London: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism)

those arrested for terrorism related offences who are later released without charge. The risk of widening the chasm between police and community trust is huge.

Sir Peter Fahy, the former chief constable of Greater Manchester Police, addressing the potential for officers to be drawn into areas that have no bearing on policing and which encroach upon fundamental freedoms has said aspects of the Government's counter extremism policy risks turning officers into "thought police ... policing religion and not just Muslims."⁷¹

In his 2014 annual review report, the Independent Reviewer, referring to the proposed Extremism Bill and plans to introduce extremism disruption orders and banning orders for mosques warned, "If the wrong decisions are taken, the new law risks provoking a backlash in affected communities, hardening perceptions of an illiberal or Islamophobic approach, alienating those whose integration into British society is already fragile and playing into the hands of those who, by peddling a grievance agenda, seek to drive people further towards extremism and terrorism."⁷²

It is Prevent that has provoked "perceptions of an illiberal or Islamophobic approach" and alienation among Muslim communities.

Professor Martin Innes of the Universities' Police Science Institute at Cardiff University has found that trust levels among young Muslims towards the police have been on the decline since 2009. Among Muslim men aged 16-24, trust in police has fallen from about 70% in 2010 to 55% in 2011, rising to about 65% in 2012. Among Muslim females aged 16-24, the fall has been continuous from just under 70% in 2009 to below 60% in 2012. It is hard not to infer that the level of trust felt by young Muslims towards the police is not impacted on by the degree to which encounters with the police has become a pervasive feature of young Muslims' lives – from Prevent in the classroom and Prevent at universities to racial profiling at airports and Islamophobia in the streets.

With the centralisation of Prevent through direct monitoring of Priority Areas by the Home Office, the "sharing" of Prevent officers between local authorities and the Home Office, and the 'power to direct' set out in the CTS Act, for use against agencies found to be non-compliant with the duty, the scope for local strategies that foster greater co-operation and openness between police forces and local communities is diminished. Finding ways to foster trust in Muslim communities amidst the harm caused by Prevent is a challenge police forces must address. The role of PCCs, as "the voice of the people" and as officials elected to "hold the police to account" is crucial to ensuring that community trust is maintained and issues giving rise to distrust robustly tackled.

Commit to holding regular public meetings with local communities in order to dispel the lack of transparency about Prevent delivery and enhance on trust and confidence in police roles in programme delivery.

Our manifesto presents concerns among Muslim communities about rising Islamophobia and police methods on recording incidents and tackling anti-Muslim hate crime, including through local initiatives to address victim needs; the growing threat from the far right at home and abroad; perceptions of a 'suspect community' paradigm prevailing and casting suspicion over individuals of Muslim background; stop and search at ports and airports; low level representation in consultative forums and in the police profession and most significantly the role of the police in the delivery of the counter-terrorism strategy strand, Prevent.

The Vision 2020 strategy and the push to increase diversity in policing is laudable but these aims cannot be divorced from the operational aspects of policing and the encounters between individuals of BME background and police officers.

Framing Muslims in the context of security emboldens anti-Muslim hostility among groups who exploit fears about terrorism by scapegoating Muslim communities. A dysfunctional symbiosis is evident in policing practices which inadvertently raise the threat to Muslims

71. 'Anti-extremism drive puts British values at risk, says police chief' *The Guardian*, 19 October 2015

72. *ibid*, p65

by escalating fears about 'Islamist' terrorism and in counter-terrorism measures.

To cite from an article by Pantazis and Pemberton, "...the targeting of specific groups by counter-terrorist measures offer wider society [the] 'permission to hate,' and, consequently, may provide an 'ideological and moral license to anti-Muslim hate crime.'...[thus] the suspicion that underlies the policing of Muslim communities would appear to have legitimated...the hate crime experienced by Muslims'.⁷³

These issues deserve wider regard if not for the reason that they harm Muslim communities and subject them to discriminatory treatment, then because they undermine the collective effort to tackle threats to collective and individual security through better co-operation between police and citizens.

Studies on lone actor terrorism by academics at University College London and a consortium led by the Royal United Services Institute, demonstrate evidence of 'leakage' with lone actor terrorists disclosing details of their intent to commit acts of terrorism to a third party. Gill et al, in their study of 119 lone actor terrorists in the US and Europe found that "In 82.4% of the cases, other people were aware of the individual's grievance that spurred the terrorist plot, and in 79%, other individuals were aware of the individual's commitment to a specific extremist ideology. In 63.9% of the cases, family and friends were aware of the individual's intent to engage in terrorism-related activities because the offender verbally told them."

As Gill et al conclude, "These findings suggest therefore that friends and family can play important roles in efforts that seek to prevent terrorist plots."⁷⁴

Cultivating police trust and confidence in communities is not just good policing, it is effective policing. We hope this manifesto is a positive contribution to that process.

73. Pantazis, C. and Pemberton, S. (2009) 'From the "old" to the "new" suspect community: examining the impacts of recent UK counter-terrorist legislation'. *British Journal of Criminology*, 49, p. 661.

74. Gill, P., Horgan, J and P. Deckert. (2013) Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists, *Journal of Forensic Sciences* vol 59 (2): 425-435.

Appendix 1 - far right costs of protests table

Constabulary	2013	2014	2015	Cost of policing protests	Notes
Avon and Somerset	Bristol (EDL)	Bristol (EDL)	n/a	£87,864	FOI ref: 1658/15
Bedfordshire	Luton (EDL)	Luton (EDL) Luton (EDL)	Luton (BF)	£529,777	FOI ref: 2015-02440
Cambridgeshire	Cambridge (EDL) Peterborough (EDL)	Peterborough (EDL)	n/a	£144,500*	*EDL protest 29/03/2014, FOI ref: 0054/2015 (open source)
Cheshire	n/a	n/a	n/a		N/A
Cleveland	Middlesbrough (EDL) Hartlepool (EDL)	n/a	Skelton (NEI, NF) East Cleveland (NEI)		Information not disclosed
Cumbria	n/a	n/a	n/a		N/A
Dorset	n/a	Bournemouth (EDL)	n/a	£130,000	BBC News, 1 December 2014. Accessed at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-dorset-30276421
Devon and Cornwall	Plymouth (EDL) Exeter(EDL)	n/a	n/a	£106,924	FOI ref: 0761/16
Derbyshire	n/a	n/a	n/a		N/A
Durham	South Shields (EDL) Shotton (EDL) Shotton Colliery (EDL) Hartlepool(EDL&NEI)	n/a	Stockton (NEI) Bishop Auckland Against Islam	£69,158.01	FOI ref: 905/15
Dyfed Powys	n/a	n/a	n/a		N/A
Essex	n/a	n/a	Colchester (EDL)		Information not disclosed
Gloucestershire	n/a	n/a	n/a		N/A


Greater Manchester	Manchester (EDL) Manchester (EDL) Ashton under Lyne (EDL) Ashton under Lyne (EDL;NWI;Casuals United) Bolton (EDL)	Bolton (BNP) Wigan (BF) Bolton (EDL)	Manchester (NWI) Oldham (NWI) Manchester City (EDL) Manchester (White Pride & NF) Manchester (NF&NWI) Wigan (NF)	£1,700,000	ITV News, 7 March 2015. Accessed at http://www.itv.com/news/granada/update/2015-03-07/manchester-braces-itself-for-massive-police-operation/ ; Manchester City Council Scrutiny Committee 11 Dec 2013, available at www.manchester.gov.uk/.../6_demonstrations_and_policy_communities_Scrutiny_report_DEC_2013%20(1).pdf
Gwent	n/a	n/a	n/a		N/A
Hampshire	Portsmouth (EDL; South East Alliance) Portsmouth (EDL)	Southampton (EDL) Portsmouth (EDL) Portsmouth (EDL)	Hampshire (EDL)		Information not disclosed
Hertfordshire	n/a	Hemel Hempstead (BNP) Stevenage (EDL)	n/a	£2, 027	FOI Ref: 158/16
Humberside	Hull (EDL) Hull (EDL) Hull (EDL)	n/a	n/a		Information not disclosed
Kent	n/a	Gillingham (BF) Dover (NF,BNP and South East Alliance) Rochester (BF) Rochester (BF)	Dover (NF,BNP and South East Alliance) Dover (EDL) Dover (NF)	£46,238	FOI Ref: 15/12/1201
Lancashire	Burnley (EDL,NWI)	n/a	Blackpool (EDL)	£150,000	FOI Ref: 7302/15 and http://www.lancashiretelegraph.co.uk/
Leicestershire	Leicester (EDL)	n/a	n/a		Information not disclosed
Lincolnshire	n/a	Grantham (EDL)	Lincoln (EDL)	£265,887	FOI Ref: 000405/16

Merseyside	n/a	n/a	Liverpool (National Action) Liverpool (National Action)	£48,652	FOI Ref: DJ 364/15
Norfolk	Norwich	n/a	n/a	£122,156	FOI Ref: 000446/15
Northamptonshire	Northampton (EDL)	n/a	n/a		FOI response stated that no demonstrations of this kind has been held.
Northumbria	Sunderland (EDL,NEI) Newcastle (EDL)	Newcastle (EDL) Berwick Upon Tweed (SDL,NEI) Sunderland (NEI, Sunderland Defence League)	Newcastle (EDL) Newcastle (Pegida) Newcastle upon Tyne (National Action) Newcastle (EDL)		Information not disclosed
North Wales	n/a	n/a	n/a		N/A
Nottinghamshire	n/a	n/a	Nottingham (Notts Casual Infidels)		Information not disclosed
North Yorkshire	n/a	Middlesbrough (EDL) Middlesbrough (EDL)	Scarborough (EDL)	£9,177	FOI Ref: 823.2015-16
South Wales	Swansea (NF)	Swansea (White Pride) Cardiff (Welsh Alliance) Newport (NF)	n/a		No Response
South Yorkshire	Sheffield (EDL) Sheffield (EDL) Sheffield (EDL)	Rotherham (EDL) Rotherham (BF) Rotherham (EDL) Rotherham (BF) Rotherham (EDL)	Sheffield (EDL) Rotherham (EDL) Rotherham (BF)	£3,356,211.23	FOI Ref: 20151192
Suffolk	Ipswich (EDL) Ipswich (EDL)	n/a	n/a	£00.00	FOI Ref: 000446/15 No costs for Ipswich March. Conjunction with Norfolk.

Staffordshire	n/a	n/a	Burton (BF) Burton (BF)	£77,840	FOI Ref: 6443
Sussex	Brighton (EDL)	Brighton (EDL)	n/a	£887,973	FOI Ref: 1045/15
Surrey	n/a	n/a	n/a		N/A
Thames Valley	n/a	Slough (EDL) Thatcham (EDL)	Oxford (EDL) Slough (Berkshire Infidels)	£ 99,189.28	FOI Ref: 003341/15
Warwickshire	Coventry (EDL)	n/a	n/a		Information not disclosed
West Mercia	n/a	n/a	n/a		N/A
West Midlands	Solihull (EDL) Birmingham (EDL)	Birmingham (EDL)	Dudley (EDL) Solihull (EDL) Dudley (BF) Dudley (AF- FFMAI) Birmingham (EDL) Walsall (EDL)	£1,797,100	FOI Ref: 007152/15
West Yorkshire	Leeds (EDL) Bradford (EDL) Wakefield (EDL)	Batley (EDL)	Wakefield (NF)	£22,364.61 (2013 provided only)	FOI Ref: 20132/324799
Wiltshire	n/a	n/a	n/a		N/A
TOTAL	40	36	39	£19,294,774.26	

Appendix 2 Number of BME police officers, by police force area, as at 31 March 2015

Source: Police workforce, England and Wales: 31 March 2015 (Home Office, 28 January 2016)





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